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The Inequity of Informal Guidance
Joshua D. Blank *
Leigh Osofsky **
The coexistence of formal and informal law is a hallmark feature of the
U.S. tax system. Congress and the Treasury enact formal law, such as statutes
and regulations, while the Internal Revenue Service offers the public informal
explanations and summaries, such as taxpayer publications, website frequently
asked questions, virtual assistants, and other types of taxpayer guidance.
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRS increased its use of informal law
to help taxpayers understand complex emergency relief rules implemented
through the tax system.
In contrast to many other legal scholars who have examined important
administrative law issues regarding informal tax guidance, in this Article, we
reframe the topic as a social justice issue. We argue that the two tiers of formal
and informal law in the U.S. tax system systematically disadvantage taxpayers
who lack access to sophisticated advisors. This imbalance occurs irrespective of
whether the IRS’s informal law contains statements that, if taxpayers followed
them, would be taxpayer favorable or unfavorable. When the guidance contains
taxpayer-favorable positions, the IRS is not legally bound by these positions
and, during an audit, can contradict or ignore them. But when the guidance
contains taxpayer-unfriendly positions, taxpayers who rely on them are bound
to these interpretations as a practical matter. Worse yet, these taxpayers have
almost no protection against tax penalties for incorrect positions that they claim
based on the IRS’s tax guidance. By contrast, taxpayers who can access and
apply the formal sources of tax law, such as the Internal Revenue Code and
Treasury Regulations, often through lawyers, are in a significantly better
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strategic position. They can rely on binding law, they can try to take the most
advantageous positions possible, and, if they meet a relatively low bar of
reasonableness, they will have penalty protections in doing so.
After highlighting the growing gap between formal and informal tax
law, and the resulting systemic inequity it causes, we explore potential policy
approaches to address it. We consider reforming the drafting of the formal tax
law; changing the drafting of informal tax law to include warnings to taxpayers
and cross-references to formal tax law; revising the law regarding taxpayer
reliance on informal tax law; and developing IRS research on how reliance on
informal tax law varies based on taxpayers’ income, filing status, race, and
other personal characteristics.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................
I.
TWO-TIERED LEGAL SYSTEMS: FORMAL AND
INFORMAL LAW ..................................................................
A.
Concerns About Tiered Legal Systems Generally ..
B.
Two-Tiered Legal Drafting ....................................
C.
The Expanding Gap ...............................................
D.
Who Uses the Public System of Law? ....................
II.
TWO-TIERED LEGAL DRAFTING AND THE TAX LAW ...........
A.
Formal Tax Law ....................................................
B.
Informal Tax Law ..................................................
C.
The Role of Tax Lawyers ........................................
D.
Access to Justice .....................................................
1.
Unambiguous Informal Tax Law ...............
2.
Taxpayer-Unfavorable Informal Tax Law .
3.
Taxpayer-Favorable Informal Tax Law .....
E.
Beyond Tax Law ....................................................
III.
CAN TWO-TIERED LEGAL DRAFTING BE REFORMED? ........
A.
Reform of Formal Law ...........................................
B.
Reform of Informal Law ........................................
C.
Taxpayer Reliance on Informal Law .....................
1.
Binding Informal Law ................................
2.
Tax Penalty Defenses .................................
D.
Taxpayer Characteristics .......................................
CONCLUSION .................................................................................

1095
1099
1099
1102
1107
1108
1110
1110
1116
1122
1126
1127
1127
1131
1138
1140
1140
1145
1148
1148
1151
1154
1157

2022]

THE INEQUITY OF INFORMAL GUIDANCE

1095

INTRODUCTION
Taxpayers have the right to know what they need to do to comply
with the tax laws.
—Internal Revenue Service, Taxpayer Bill of Rights 1
I didn’t think that it mattered that much whether a lay person
turned to the [Internal Revenue] Code and what the provisions
looked like.
—Former federal tax legislation drafter 2
Inequities plague the legal system. Well-known inequities exist
in criminal law, 3 property law, 4 policing, 5 immigration, 6 judging, 7 and
many other areas. As a result, many members of the public have come
to believe that, in the United States, there is a “two-tiered” legal system
where the government’s disparate enforcement of the law perpetuates
systems of supremacy and subordination. 8 These inequitable

1.
Taxpayer Bill of Rights: The Right to Be Informed, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights (last updated Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VXB64YMQ].
2.
Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in Statutory Drafting:
Interviews with Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1291, 1316 n.104 (2019).
3.
See, e.g., SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED
INTOLERANCE (Mar. 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racialdisparities/ [https://perma.cc/DCD4-6X39] (discussing racial disparities in the United States
criminal justice system).
4.
See, e.g., K-Sue Park, Conquest and Slavery in the Property Law Course: Notes for
Teachers,
GEO.
UNIV.
L.
CTR.
(July
24,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3659947&download=yes
[https://perma.cc/ZA7B-W657] (describing history of slavery and subordination at the heart of
property law).
5.
See, e.g., Mahoney v. Owens, 818 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Racism in policing
is a particularly brutal facet of our country’s mistreatment of Black people.”).
6.
See, e.g., Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, Essay, White Nationalism as Immigration
Policy, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198–203 (2019) (suggesting that certain U.S. immigration
rhetorics and policies are steeped in white nationalism).
7.
See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 110–11 (2017) (finding
negative, implicit bias by judges against certain groups, with impacts on judicial outcomes).
8.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Deskovic, Looking Back: Our Two-Tiered Justice System, DAVIS
VANGUARD (Dec. 27, 2020), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2020/12/looking-back-our-two-tieredjustice-system/ [https://perma.cc/TWB9-PWG4].
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substantive and enforcement features of the law, in turn, undermine
social justice. 9
But there is another important, underappreciated inequity in
the legal system: different people have access to different forms of the
law, and these different forms of the law do not have equal value.
Formal law, such as statutes, regulations, and case law, is binding on
the government, but it is nearly impossible for most people to
understand. 10 On the other hand, informal law, such as agency
explanations, instructions, website frequently asked questions, and
other forms of administrative guidance, is easier for most people to
understand, yet it does not bind the government. 11 This two-tiered
system of law both dovetails with and exacerbates the inequities in
substance and enforcement of law that others have identified.
The coexistence of both formal and informal law is a defining
characteristic of the U.S. tax system. The tax law has widespread reach,
resulting in close to 175 million individual, estate, and trust income tax
returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) each year. 12 Yet
very few people can comprehend the formal law that dictates tax
obligations, such as the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”), the
Treasury Regulations (“Regulations”), and case law. 13 Moreover, those
who draft the formal tax law do not even intend for most people to
comprehend it. 14 Instead, both tax law drafters and those who
administer the tax law system expect the IRS and nongovernment
advisors to fill in the gulf between the formal tax law and the public’s
understanding of it. 15 To assist those taxpayers who lack access to
sophisticated advisors, the IRS offers tax guidance, a free, publicly
accessible type of informal law. 16 Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic,
the IRS increased its use of informal law as a way to help taxpayers
understand complex emergency relief rules implemented through the
tax system. 17

9.
The meaning of social justice is contested and context dependent, but, in any event, is
undermined when institutional structures fail to protect rights and just outcomes of certain groups
of people in favor of others. See, e.g., JANET L. FINN, JUST PRACTICE: A SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH
TO SOCIAL WORK 13–31 (4th ed. 2020) (exploring social justice practice and frameworks).
10. See infra notes 262–266 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 262–266 and accompanying text.
12. Returns Filed, Taxes Collected & Refunds Issued, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/returns-filed-taxes-collected-and-refunds-issued (last updated June
24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Q9H8-D5CL].
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to many other legal scholars who have examined
important administrative law issues regarding informal tax guidance, 18
in this Article, we reframe the topic as a social justice issue. We argue
that the two tiers of formal and informal tax law systematically
disadvantage taxpayers who lack access to sophisticated advisors. This
imbalance occurs irrespective of whether the IRS’s tax guidance
contains statements that, if taxpayers followed them, would be
taxpayer favorable or unfavorable. When the guidance contains
taxpayer-favorable positions, the IRS is not legally bound by these
positions and, during an audit, can contradict or ignore them. 19 When
the guidance contains taxpayer-unfriendly positions, taxpayers who
rely on them are bound to these interpretations as a practical matter. 20
Worse yet, these taxpayers have almost no protection against tax
penalties for incorrect positions that they claimed based on the IRS’s
tax guidance. 21
By contrast, taxpayers who can access and apply the formal
sources of tax law, such as the Code, Regulations, and case law, often
through lawyers, are in a significantly better strategic position. When
the formal tax law makes clear what the tax outcome is, taxpayers who
can access this information can rely upon it. 22 When the formal tax law
does not make clear what the tax outcome is, taxpayers who can access
these formal sources of tax law, usually with the assistance of advisors,
can at least attempt to claim the most advantageous position (within
reason) that these formal sources of law permit. 23 These taxpayers often
have a good shot at winning, or at least avoiding penalties for trying,
even if the position they claim is contrary to a taxpayer-unfavorable
approach in the IRS’s tax guidance. 24 As a result, compared to
taxpayers who must rely on tax guidance from the IRS, well-resourced
taxpayers who can access the formal tax law have a greater ability to
pursue taxpayer-favorable outcomes. 25 Further, as we discuss, the
disparate effects of formal and informal law may correlate with
taxpayer characteristics such as income, rurality, gender, and race. 26
Our Article thus underscores how the drafting of the formal law
is not a mere technocratic function. Rather, legal drafting provides
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra notes 236–244 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 262–266 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 262–266 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 262–266 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.D.
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different groups of people with different, hierarchical relationships to
the formal law, even before considering the formal law’s substance or
enforcement. Drafting of the formal law thereby has important
implications for social justice. While the tax law is an acute example of
the inequitable impacts of informal and formal law, it is not unique.
Rather, tax law epitomizes a phenomenon that exists throughout the
U.S. legal system. 27
Further, this two-tiered legal drafting system is not just an
unfortunate by-product of different groups of people having different
access to resources, but also is an ironic by-product of the Plain Writing
Act of 2010. 28 Formal law in many areas is often comprised of complex
statutes, regulations, and other legal materials that are difficult for
much of the public to understand. 29 The Plain Writing Act of 2010
responds to this problem by requiring federal agencies to use language
that explains the law to members of the public in ways they can
understand. 30 However, the Act systematically perpetuates the
inequities we have identified in this Article. By creating an alternative
system of informal law for those who do not have access to the primary
sources of formal law, the Plain Writing Act necessarily creates a
second-tier system of informal law that lacks some of the protections
and opportunities in the formal law. In this way, the Act obscures the
very advantages it solidifies for those who already have the resources
to access the formal law that remains in place.
After highlighting the growing gap between formal and informal
tax law, and the resulting inequity it causes, we explore potential policy
approaches to address it. First, we offer proposals for reforming the way
in which formal tax law is drafted, such as through the use of rule-based
statutory provisions and formalization of statutory language. 31 Second,
we outline changes to informal tax law that policymakers can adopt
without legislation, such as the inclusion of warnings to taxpayers of
contrary authorities in the formal tax law. 32 Third, we consider whether
and how the current law regarding taxpayer reliance on informal tax
27. See infra Part II.E.
28. Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861; see also Joshua D. Blank
& Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189, 202–04 (2017)
[hereinafter Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity] (describing the goals of the plain language movement);
Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Automated Legal Guidance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 179, 208
(2020) [hereinafter Blank & Osofsky, Automated] (exploring how simplexity is a by-product of the
plain language movement).
29. See infra Part I.A.
30. Law and Requirements, PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION & INFO. NETWORK,
https://www.plainlanguage.gov/law/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/25FN-HP8Y].
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part III.B.
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law, especially regarding the application of tax penalties, could be
revised to create more equitable tax enforcement. 33 Finally, we propose
research that the IRS should conduct to understand how certain
taxpayer characteristics, such as income, filing status, and race,
correlate with the likelihood of relying on informal tax law. 34
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
describes scholarly analysis of ways in which the substance and
enforcement of the legal system create class, race, and gender
inequities, and introduces the concept of two-tiered legal drafting. Part
II shows how two-tiered legal drafting disproportionately and
systematically harms taxpayers who cannot afford sophisticated
advisors. Part III presents several policy options for further studying
and ameliorating the effects of two-tiered legal drafting. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. TWO-TIERED LEGAL SYSTEMS: FORMAL AND INFORMAL LAW
A. Concerns About Tiered Legal Systems Generally
Legal scholars and other commentators have identified ways
that both the substance and enforcement of our legal system perpetuate
inequities. 35 These inequities are deeply rooted in racism, sexism, and
other class-based forms of discrimination that subordinate historically
marginalized groups. 36 These inequities in the legal system exacerbate
existing inequalities.
As an especially salient example, scholars have reached
widespread agreement that criminal law and law enforcement visit
great inequity on people of color. 37 The spate of police killings of Black
people is a searing indictment and epitomization of how this inequity

33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra notes 37–51.
See infra notes 37–51; see, e.g., David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Black-White Wage Gap Is
as
Big
as
It
Was
in
1950,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/sunday/race-wage-gap.html
[https://perma.cc/BX8Q-UMYA] (exploring large wage gaps between Black and white individuals);
Seven Charts that Show Covid-19’s Impact on Women’s Employment, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 8,
2021),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/seven-charts-thatshow-covid-19s-impact-on-womens-employment# [https://perma.cc/B8BH-8JZ4] (detailing how
COVID-19 dealt a major setback to women in the workplace); Christopher Wildeman & Emily A.
Wang, Mass Incarceration, Public Health, and Widening Inequality in the USA, 389 LANCET 1464
(2017) (examining how mass incarceration leads to health inequality).
37. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of Black
Punitiveness, 127 YALE L.J. 2388, 2393 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR
OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)).
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exacts the most extreme consequences. 38 Behind these horrific deaths
lies a system of criminal laws that has long punished Black and brown
communities disproportionately. 39
These inequities in the criminal law are matched by inequities
across the legal system. For instance, in property law, the U.S. Supreme
Court embraced a racial hierarchy in property rights 40 when it deemed
Native Americans to be “fierce savages” whose claim to land was
necessarily subordinate to that of European conquerors. 41 For their
part, Black people by and large began their experience with the U.S.
property system as subjects of it, in the form of enslaved people who
themselves had no property rights. 42 Even after slavery was outlawed,
the property law system continued to racially discriminate, including
through a notorious “redlining” system in which the government
devalued property based on explicitly racist justifications, contributing
to lasting segregation. 43 Women have suffered their own disabilities at
the hands of property law, having long been subject to the doctrine of
coverture. This doctrine meant that married women were legally
subsumed by their husbands. This not only prevented married women
from acquiring property in their own names, devising property by will,
or claiming any of their earnings during their marriage, but also
subjected them to legally sanctioned “correction” by their husbands,
disallowed them from bringing rape charges against their husbands,
and prevented them from bringing suit without joining their

38. See Cheryl W. Thompson, Fatal Police Shootings of Unarmed Black People Reveal
Troubling
Patterns,
NPR
(Jan.
25,
2021,
5:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/956177021/fatal-police-shootings-of-unarmed-black-peoplereveal-troubling-patterns [https://perma.cc/DHM7-776X].
39. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing that the U.S. system of mass incarceration
creates a racial caste system); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (identifying the
mechanisms through which mass incarceration inflicts disproportionate and immoral harm on
Black communities).
40. See Park, supra note 4, at 1–20 (discussing how U.S. property law is predicated on a
history of racial violence and subjugation).
41. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590, 603 (1823).
42. See, e.g., Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 843–44 (1838) (“[O]ur statute law
prohibits slaves from owning certain kinds of property, and it may be inferred[ ] that the
legislature supposed they were extending the act as far as it could be necessary to exclude them
from owning any property . . . .”); see also Michele Goodwin, A Different Type of Property: White
Women and the Human Property They Kept, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2021) (reviewing HARRIET A.
JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A GIRL (L. Maria Child & Jean Fagan Yellin eds., 1987) and
STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2019)) (discussing how white women subjugated Blacks during slavery).
43. NPR, Housing Segregation and Redlining in America: A Short History, YOUTUBE (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5FBJyqfoLM [https://perma.cc/F9UG-69K5].
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husbands. 44 Scholars have traced how the legacy of coverture continues
to disempower women with accompanying broad, societal impacts
inside of marriage, 45 outside of marriage, 46 and through immigration
law. 47
Scholars have also shown how even areas of the law that, at first
blush, seem less likely to be foci for discriminatory treatment
nonetheless are rife with it in both substance and enforcement. For
instance, in pathbreaking work, Professor Dorothy Brown has shown
how seemingly neutral tax law has disproportionate impacts based on
race, in particular impoverishing Black Americans. 48 Brown focuses on
how the tax rules that apply to marriage, home ownership, education,
employee compensation, investment, and wealth create a racially
discriminatory tax system. 49 Others have begun to focus on racial
disparities in IRS auditing, pointing out that audit rates tend to focus
to a greater extent on taxpayers of color. 50 Indeed, at least some
lawmakers have demanded to know more about whether IRS audit
rates reflect racially discriminatory patterns. 51
The examples of how the substance and enforcement of the law
have subordinated and even victimized historically marginalized
groups could go on and on. The bottom line is not an uplifting one.
Through a painful but critical reckoning, commentators have displayed
how both the substance and enforcement of the legal system are
unequal. The law, as written and in practice, systemically discriminates
44. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442–45.
45. Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1361
(1983); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 844–48 (2004); Reva
B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 18601930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2131 (1994).
46. Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139, 2144 (2019).
47. Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 593 (1991); Mariela Olivares, Battered by Law: The Political Subordination of
Immigrant Women, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 231 (2014).
48. DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH (2021). The Whiteness of Wealth was a
culminating moment, built on Brown’s career as an incisive, and leading, scholar on race and the
tax law.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., CHYE-CHING HUANG & RODERICK TAYLOR, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
HOW THE FEDERAL TAX CODE CAN BETTER ADVANCE RACIAL EQUITY 17–21 (July 2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-25-19tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AF6-L24R]
(summarizing findings).
51. Paul Kiel, Lawmakers Just Confronted the IRS over Tax Audits that Target the Poor,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 10, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/lawmakers-to-irscommissioner-charles-rettig-system-stacked-for-the-rich [https://perma.cc/Z4XG-8QK2]; Steven
Dean, Beware the Unintended Consequences of Biden’s New IRS Spending, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May
5, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-beware-the-unintendedconsequences-of-bidens-irs-spending-20210505-ty6iwne2eneupocy26mnkcd2au-story.html
[https://perma.cc/RY9G-FW5S].
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against historically marginalized groups in ways that undermine our
progress toward greater social justice.
B. Two-Tiered Legal Drafting
Our Article starts where this analysis leaves off. If the law, as
written and in practice, systemically discriminates, what about how the
law is written? In other words, putting aside the substance of the law
on the page and the way that agencies and law enforcement translate
law to practice, what about the process of putting the law on the page
in the first place? Does the drafting of the law itself discriminate?
As an initial matter, there are, of course, many sources of law
which can be categorized along a variety of dimensions, including law
that originates in statutes versus common law, as well as federal law
versus state law versus local law, and many other variations. In this
Article, we focus principally on federal law carried out by agencies. We
do so for tractability, but also because the bodies of federal law that
emanate from the administrative state are responsibile for regulating
enormous amounts of our lives, from the air we breathe, to the food we
eat, to the working conditions we are entitled to, to the social security
we will collect, and much more. 52 As a result, to the extent that the
drafting of this body of law has any discriminatory effects, they are
likely wide-ranging and impactful. We believe similar analysis would
be fruitful in other legal regimes, including those that are principcally
nonfederal or based in common law, the Constitution, or other sources
of law.
If federal law carried out by agencies is the source of our
examination, then it must begin with the federal statutes that Congress
creates. These statutes set the foundation for and parameters around
the law that agencies carry out. 53 While assessing the complexity of law
is a tricky business, 54 thankfully no close calls have to be made—federal
52. Cf. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1234 (1994) (lamenting federal government’s seeming “general jurisdiction over citizens’ affairs”).
53. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, From Legislation to Regulation: An
Empirical Examination of Agency Responsiveness to Congressional Delegations of Regulatory
Authority, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 395, 397 (2016) (describing the relationship between Congress and
federal agencies).
54. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1992) (explaining how any attempt to examine legal complexity is “fraught with
difficulties”); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1601–22 (2012)
(offering a trenchant critique of laments about “hyperlexis” in the law); J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin
Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 194 (2015);
R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less
Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 716 (2000) (“Complexity in the law is much more complex
than we imagine.”).
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statutes are both extremely extensive and complex. Ushered in by a
sweeping reimagination of the federal government starting, but
certainly not ending, with the New Deal, the statutes that govern the
administrative state have ballooned over time, both in size and
involvement in everyday life. 55 Determining with certainty the
extensiveness of even one subject matter of this vast apparatus is
difficult. 56 Multiplied across the entirety, this task becomes intractable.
It is easy to conclude, however, that the federal statutes governing the
administrative state are extremely difficult to read. For instance,
environmental law scholars have bemoaned how federal environmental
statutes “maintain an almost overwhelming degree of complexity.” 57
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has compared federal
immigration laws to “King Minos’s labyrinth.” 58 And federal courts have
reasoned that the complexity of the Medicare statute is so “tremendous”
that courts should be more deferential to the Agency’s interpretations. 59
As complex and detailed as these federal statutes are, the
regulations that agencies promulgate to carry them out increase both
the length and complexity of the law by an order of magnitude. 60 As a
general matter, administrative regulations tend to contain a plethora
of highly technical rules, combined with numerous unanswered
questions, and even downright contradictions. 61 They are also
voluminous and prone to grow over time through a process of regulatory
accretion. 62 For instance, one commentator has noted that the Clean Air
Act, at times referred to as “the most complicated statute in history” is
55. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 12–13 (5th prtg. 2010) (describing new wave of regulation
promulgated in the 1960s and 1970s); Ronald A. Cass, Staying Agency Rules: Constitutional
Structure and Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 238 (2017) (tracing
the trend back to New Deal, but noting its continuation through subsequent presidential
administrations). Bayless Manning, perhaps notoriously, declared, “Statutory codes, such as those
in the fields of commercial law and taxation, are becoming ever more particularistic, longer, more
complex, and less comprehensible. We are drowning in law.” Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our
National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977).
56. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE:
2008
ANNUAL
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
1
(Dec.
2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7J3-36C9]
(describing difficulty in determining how long the Internal Revenue Code is).
57. Blake Hudson, Relative Administrability, Conservatives, and Environmental Regulatory
Reform, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1661, 1674 (2016).
58. Lok v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
59. Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
60. Cass, supra note 55, at 228.
61. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 761 (2003) (discussing such
complexity).
62. Id. at 783–88; see also Manning, supra note 55, at 773 (“Old laws and old agencies neither
die nor fade away; being nonbiodegradable they only accumulate.”).
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“compounded by the thousands of pages of federal regulations and the
overlapping statutes and regulations adopted by each individual
state.” 63
To make matters even more complicated, as detailed as
statutory and regulatory regimes are, they nonetheless leave many
open questions. Indeed, in a somewhat perverse, but predictable,
fashion the very intricacy of the statutes and regulations tends to create
additional questions about how, exactly, a specific administrative
provision applies in a specific context. 64 This means that courts and
administrative decisionmakers have to create yet more law in order to
interpret the ambiguities left in the statutory and regulatory regimes. 65
Even putting aside ambiguities in regulatory regimes, critical aspects
of such regimes are often subject to legal challenge or political reversal,
placing into further doubt the extent to which regulated parties can rely
on regulatory rules to govern their behavior. 66 Understanding how the
resulting judicial interventions and subsequent agency actions affect
and change the regulatory regime requires a high level of lawyerly
expertise. 67 The result is that statutory and regulatory schemes, which
govern immense aspects of daily life, nonetheless are not
comprehensible to large swaths of the governed.
This yields a predictable problem. How can federal statutory and
regulatory regimes widely govern daily life when many, if not most,
people and businesses subject to them cannot understand them? This
dilemma is apparent from the examples courts pointed to above. If
federal environmental laws “maintain an almost overwhelming degree
of complexity,” 68 how will small businesses that are subject to them, and
critical to the law’s success—know how to comply with them? 69 If
federal immigration laws are akin to “King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient
63. Erich Birch, Air Quality Regulation in the United States: A Complicated System Yields
Laudable Results, BUS. L. TODAY, July–Aug. 2007, at 13, 13.
64. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 871
(1999) (“The more complex tax law gets, the greater the number of interactions among the rules
and the more complex the law must be.”).
65. Extensive judicial attention has been paid to what deference courts should accord
agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous regulations. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)
(examining questions of Auer deference).
66. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98
TEX. L. REV. 265, 266 (2019).
67. William J. Brennan, Jr., Commencement Address Delivered to Loyola Law School Class
of 1986, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 726–27 (1998) (“[Lawyers] alone . . . are equipped to penetrate
directly and incisively to the core of a problem through the cloud of statute, rules, regulations and
rulings which invariably obscure it to the lay eye . . . .”).
68. Hudson, supra note 57, at 1674.
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
69. Cf.,
e.g.,
Small
Business
Compliance,
U.S.
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/small-business-compliance (last updated Feb. 5, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/NLX3-S2FK] (providing resources for small businesses).

2022]

THE INEQUITY OF INFORMAL GUIDANCE

1105

Crete,” 70 how will immigrants, who are often already vulnerable and
face language barriers, 71 know how to navigate the system? If the
Medicare statute is filled with “tremendous complexity,” 72 how will the
tens of millions of individuals enrolled in it know what they are entitled
to receive? 73 Must each of the parties mentioned in these examples
attempt to decipher the complex and voluminous federal statutes,
regulations, and case law that govern their behavior, or hire highly
skilled lawyers to do so? 74
The answer to this problem is that federal agencies translate
complex statutory and regulatory regimes (and their accompanying
case law) into easily accessible “plain language.” 75 For instance, among
many other efforts, the EPA offers Compliance Assistance Centers,
which “help businesses, colleges and universities, local governments,
tribes and federal facilities understand and comply with environmental
requirements.” 76 The Compliance Assistance Centers “offer easy access
to plain-language materials and other resources on environmental
compliance.” 77 The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) likewise offers practical advice that translates the law for
people, including through a virtual assistant, Emma. 78 And the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services offers users the ability to enter a
test, item, or service to see whether it is covered. 79 Indeed, the Agency
even offers a “What’s Covered” app for mobile devices, which “helps you
70. Lok v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
71. Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600 (2008).
72. Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
73. CMS Releases Latest Enrollment Figures for Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health
Insurance Programs (CHIP), CMS.GOV (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/newsalert/cms-releases-latest-enrollment-figures-medicare-medicaid-and-childrens-health-insuranceprogram-chip [https://perma.cc/2UGE-CQ2X]; see also Medicare Enrollment, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-systems/cms-program-statistics/2019-medicareenrollment-section#Total (last modified Feb. 3, 2022, 10:28 AM) [https://perma.cc/EW5LPGTB].
74. There is another important question that should be examined in future work: How should
the numerous federal employees charged with applying the complex statutory and regulatory
regimes know how to apply them? Cf., e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking
Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001)
(exploring agencies’ explaining to their internal agents how to properly apply the law).
75. Courts have begun employing similar tactics. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know
and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L. REV. 443, 455–56 (2016)
(describing courts’ development of “plain language forms” for tasks like pleadings).
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
76. Compliance
Assistance
Centers,
U.S.
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/compliance-assistance-centers (last updated Nov. 5, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/U27J-PR78].
77. Id.
78. Meet Emma, Our Virtual Assistant, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/emma (last updated Apr. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/GW6R-33BQ]; see also
Blank & Osofsky, Automated, supra note 28, at 181 (exploring automated legal guidance).
79. Plain Writing, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/plain-writing (last
visited Feb. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4DDM-JR93].
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understand the health care coverage offered by Original Medicare Part
A (Hospital Insurance) and Part B (Medical Insurance).” 80 All three
agencies profess their adherence to plain language principles in offering
these and other communications to the public, 81 and USCIS even has a
series of relatable YouTube videos explaining how to apply plain
language principles to its communications. 82
It is no coincidence that these and other federal agencies use
plain language and interactive tools to try to explain the complex
statutory and regulatory regimes in a way the public can understand.
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 requires agencies to use “clear
Government communication that the public can understand and use”
in letters, forms, notices, publications, or instructions regarding federal
benefits or tax filings or compliance with federal requirements. 83
Notably, the Plain Writing Act does not apply to federal regulations, 84
it does not apply to Congress (or the statutes Congress produces), and
it does not apply to federal courts (or the opinions that federal courts
produce).
The dynamics described above create an underappreciated, twotiered system of legal drafting: on the one hand, inordinately complex
statutes, regulations, and case law offer the law in great detail for the
few who can access it; on the other hand, agencies offer a significantly
simplied, 85 plain language explanation of the law for the rest of the
public. This creates what we refer to here as a private system of law for
the few, and a public system of law for everyone else. The small number
of people and businesses who have the expertise and resources to hire
highly skilled attorneys to decipher the formal law (as offered in as
statutes, regulations, and case law), get to access interpretations
offered by a private market: namely, highly skilled attorneys. Those
who lack the resources or wherewithal to access this private market

80. App Store Preview, What’s Covered: Official Medicare Coverage App, APPLE,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/whats-covered/id1444143600 (last visited Feb. 7, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/XF3J-G9ZL].
81. USCIS
Plain
Language,
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/uscis-plain-language
(last
visited
Feb.
7,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/W56A-LAMC];
Plain
Writing,
U.S.
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/home/plain-writing (last visited Feb. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/8HFHKCME]; MEDICARE.GOV, supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., USCIS Plain Language: Put Your Main
Message First, YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-SNW6ye9rU
[https://perma.cc/6CYH-FULV].
83. Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, §§ 2-3, 124 Stat. 2861, 2861.
84. Id. § 3(2)(C).
85. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 207 (introducing the concept of
“simplexity”).
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instead get the public option: explanations of the formal law in plain
language that are offered as a service by government agencies.
C. The Expanding Gap
We believe that, if anything, the gap between the private and
public options has only expanded, and will likely expand further over
time. First, as the world becomes more complex, so too must the
statutes and regulations that attempt to respond to it. 86 This remains
true despite periodic efforts at regulatory reductions. Various recent
presidential administrations have attempted to reduce unnecessary or
overly burdensome regulation or reduce regulatory volume. 87 And yet,
while it is very difficult to use any simple measure of regulatory
activity, it is clear that regulation has continued apace, 88 resulting in a
steady accretion over time. 89
At the same time, there has been increased chaos in the
statutory process. As government has become more polarized and
legislation has become more difficult to pass, there has been a rise in
“unorthodox legislation” to accomplish legislative objectives. 90 Among
other things, such unorthodox legislation includes the use of extreme
legislative bundling, deterioration of expert and committee control, and
increased use of rapid-fire changes and post-committee amendments. 91
Together, these phenomena result in lower opportunity for quality
control, more inadvertant, unanswered questions, and downright
statutory mistakes. 92
While some forces push regulatory and statutory complexity in
an upward direction, other forces pressure agencies to offer seemingly
clearer, easy-to-use guidance to the public. The rise of automation in
the private sector and increasing technological capacity are shaping
86. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 401 (2019).
87. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735,
51,739–40 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 3
C.F.R. § 6 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,
82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform
Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285, 12,286 (Feb. 24, 2017).
88. Reg Stats, GW REGUL. STUD. CTR., https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats
(last visited Jan. 29, 2022) [http://perma.cc/V84P-5WA4]; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume
and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1422 (2012).
89. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 61 (exploring regulatory accretion).
90. BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL POLICY
MAKING (2006).
91. Leigh Osofsky, Agency Legislative Fixes, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2107, 2115–17 (2020); see also
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS (5th ed. 2016) (providing background).
92. Osofsky, supra note 91, at 2117–18.
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expectations with respect to the law as well. 93 Individuals and
businesses that rely on agencies’ explanations are thus expecting
greater ease of use at the very time that the law itself grows more
complex. The government is responding with more, and more
innovative, attempts to simplify interactions with the law, 94 thus
yielding a greater gap between the public and private options of the law.
D. Who Uses the Public System of Law?
Recognizing that two-tiered legal drafting leads to public and
private versions of the law, and that, if anything, the gap between them
may only be expanding, is an important development in and of itself.
What makes this recognition even more pressing is the possibility that
the public and private options may not be distributed evenly across the
population. Rather, they are likely distributed based on income level,
and may even correlate with other characteristics, such as rurality,
gender, disability, and race.
The access to justice literature offers ways to begin thinking
about this possibility. While much more empirical work remains to be
done about access to justice, 95 it is clear that low-income Americans,
who generally do not have the same access to higher education, 96 suffer
from inadequate access to lawyers. Poor people are more likely to have
problems that implicate the civil law than middle- or high-income
individuals. 97 In attempting to resolve such problems, low-income
individuals often lack adequate legal counsel. An important study
documented that low-income individuals received no or inadequate
legal assistance eighty-six percent of the time. 98 A complex set of
explanations results in this unmet need for legal assistance, including,
in addition to lack of monetary resources, dearth of available legal
counsel, not knowing that legal assistance could help, a desire to handle
the situation oneself, and a general aversion to the legal system created

93.
94.
app).
95.
96.

Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 197–98.
See, e.g., supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the Medicare “What’s Covered”

Sandefur, supra note 75, at 453.
See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
(June
2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQ22-ZXPL] [hereinafter LEGAL SERVS. REP.].
97. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
USA: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY (Aug. 2014),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_in_th
e_contemporary_usa._aug._2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9KK-EKSQ] [hereinafter SANDEFUR REP.].
98. Id. at 6.
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by prior experiences with the justice system and/or a general distrust
of the legal system and a lack of faith in institutions. 99
These findings have implications for the public versus private
options created by two-tiered legal drafting. To the extent that the
private option is accessible through highly skilled attorneys,
individuals who are low-income (and who are less likely themselves to
have access to higher education) are often unlikely to access highly
skilled attorneys. Instead, they are much more likely to go it alone,
relying on simplified explanations offered by the government itself in
order to claim benefits and follow requirements. In interview research
about access to justice, Professor Sara Sternberg Greene offered a
vignette of how these dynamics played out for one individual in the case
of filing for disability benefits. The individual explained,
I hated going and filling out all that paperwork for disability. I really needed it, I could
hardly get up, my back was that shot. I got it, but they made me feel dumb. I resoluted
there and then I’d get back on me feet. And I did. I do things for myself. 100

A low-income individual who goes it alone in this way is highly unlikely
to access the complicated statutory and regulatory provisions that
comprise the disability benefits system. They are much more likely to
trudge through relying on simplified explanations offered by the
government on forms, in addition to experiences and tips shared by
family and friends. 101
Lack of access to formal law may correlate with other
characteristics, in addition to income. For instance, the access to justice
literature has examined the extent to which various other
characteristics, such as rurality, disability, and status as a veteran
affect the likelihood of receiving legal assistance. 102 Access to justice
literature also suggests that race may correlate with likelihood of
accessing lawyers. 103 Yet, as we will discuss in further detail in Part
99. LEGAL SERVS. REP., supra note 96, at 7; SANDEFUR REP., supra note 97, at 12–13.
100. Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263,
1298 (2016); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative
Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129
(2010).
101. SANDEFUR REP., supra note 97, at 11 (finding that people handled civil justice situations
through the help of family or friends twenty-three percent of the time).
102. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. REP., supra note 96, at 8 (identifying rate of civil legal problems
in these groups, among others); see also, e.g., Lisa R. Pruitt et. al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State
Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 15 (2018) (exploring legal deserts
that exist in rural areas and the accompanying access to justice crisis).
103. See, e.g., Brian Libgober, Getting a Lawyer While Black: A Field Experiment, 24 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 53, 54 (2020) (finding that lawyers responded twice as frequently to requests for
assistance from people with white-sounding names, relative to those with Black-sounding names);
Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Neilsen, Race and Representation: Racial Disparities
in Legal Representation for Employment Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
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III.D, the Treasury Department and the IRS do not currently collect
important data regarding taxpayers that would allow researchers to
examine how these differing characteristics affect taxpayers’
experiences with the tax law. In particular, Treasury and the IRS
notably fail to collect data regarding the race of taxpayers. 104
To the extent that different groups of people have access to
differents forms of the law, and those forms are not, in fact, equivalent,
the two-tiered system of law may discriminate between members of the
public in problematic ways. In the next Part, we explore this possibility
by examining in detail the similarities and differences between the
private and public versions of the tax law, an area of law that is both
extremely complicated and particularly pervasive.
II. TWO-TIERED LEGAL DRAFTING AND THE TAX LAW
The coexistence of formal and informal law is a distinguishing
feature of the U.S. tax system. In large part, this is because of the
extraordinary complexity of the formal tax law. This Part describes the
sources of formal and informal tax law in the United States, examines
the role of tax lawyers in helping taxpayers access the formal tax law,
argues that the two-tiered nature of the U.S. tax system disadvantages
taxpayers who lack access to sophisticated advisors, and, last, shows
how these features are not unique to tax law.
A. Formal Tax Law
Congress drafts the primary source of federal tax law in tax
statutes, which the Office of Law Revision Counsel then organizes in
the form of the Internal Revenue Code. 105 By all accounts, the Code is
extremely complex. 106 Scholars and policymakers have identified many
good reasons for this complexity. The Code governs a panoply of
underlying behaviors and activities, and it must be sufficiently detailed

705 (2012) (finding that higher likelihood of representation by a lawyer tended to correlate with
other characteristics (such as gender and race)).
104. See infra discussion accompanying notes 387–389.
OFF.
OF
THE
LEGIS.
COUNS.,
105. See
Drafting
Legislation,
HOUSE
https://legcounsel.house.gov/holc-guide-legislative-drafting#IIA (last visited Mar. 6, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/M7N4-VJBG] (describing codification process generally).
106. This is such a widely held view that it is difficult to choose any one source that stands for
this proposition. As Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson was especially vocal about the extent of the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Nina E. Olson, Opinion, We Still Need a Simpler
ST.
J.
(Apr.
10,
2009,
12:01
AM),
Tax
Code,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123933106888707793 [https://perma.cc/67YV-C622] (explaining
that the complexity of the Code is one of the most significant problems in the tax system).
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to do so effectively. 107 On top of being a source of revenue for the
government, the tax law also seeks to be a source of redistribution. 108
As such, it must be sufficiently complex to ensure accurate targeting of
the right amount of tax liability to the right people. 109 Moreover, in its
attempts to accurately tax and redistribute, the Code has to contend
with numerous taxpayers who will try to take advantage of loopholes in
the law in order to avoid taxation. 110 Plugging up any such loopholes to
protect revenue and ensure a fairer and more efficient tax system
increases the complexity of the Code yet again. 111 Making matters
harder still, the Code has increasingly become a means to achieve many
social goals, thus causing even more complicated and tangential
statutory rules to be included in the Code. 112
The political economy of tax legislation exacerbates these
difficulties. Various legislative limitations, such as budgeting rules,
often require tax legislation to be passed in nonintuitive ways,
including through the use of temporary, or sunsetting, provisions which
pervade the Code. 113 The salience of tax law for lobbyists and
constituents prompts politicians to frequently tinker with the Code,
creating numerous changes, and often confusing effective dates, for
various provisions. 114 Limited legislative resources and difficulty in
getting legislation passed can cause these changes to occur in rushed
fashion, undermining the quality of the legislative product and making
it yet more difficult to understand. 115
Even after accounting for the challenges detailed above, the
Code is still drafted in an extraordinarily and, some would say,
unnecessarily complex way. The Code contains intricate crossreferences, dependent clauses, and other drafting formulations, which
107. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX
REV. 645, 660 (2003) (explaining and supporting this proposition).
108. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (providing progressive marginal income tax rates).
109. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 150 (1995) (exploring the accuracy/complexity tradeoff).
110. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy for Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2018)
(providing a general taxonomy for tax loopholes).
111. Jeffrey Partlow, The Necessity of Complexity in the Tax System, 13 WYO. L. REV. 303, 315
(2013).
112. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J.
1717, 1723–36 (2014) (exploring functions of the tax law).
113. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 338 (2006) (exploring sunset provisions in the tax
code).
114. Heather M. Field, Taxpayer Choice in Legal Transitions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 505, 506 (2010)
(noting frequent changes to the tax law and exploring legal transitions).
115. See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, Agency Legislative Fixes, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2107, 2110 (2020)
(exploring these dynamics in the context of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131
Stat. 2054 (2017)).
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make it difficult for any non-tax-law experts to read the Code. 116 A great
example is the exception-that-swallows-the-rule drafting prevalent
throughout the Code, in which one provision appears to state a
universal, general principle, only to be followed by other provisions that
make the general rule inapplicable in numerous circumstances. 117
An important, but underappreciated, reason why the Code is
often drafted in these complex ways is that it is drafted by experts and
for experts. Many parties participate in drafting the Code, including, as
with other areas of law, Congresspeople, the President, their political
advisors, and lobbyists. In addition to these participants, there is also
a less well-known cadre of tax law experts that plays an important role
in the Code drafting process. Most notably, the Joint Committee on
Taxation is a nonpartisan committee of experts charged with assisting
Congress with every aspect of the legislative process, including
developing legislative proposals, preparing revenue estimates, and
drafting legislative histories of tax law. 118
The Joint Committee includes both Congresspeople (as
members) and high-level tax law and economics experts (as staff
members). 119 Tax law experts also guide the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, as well as the political
parties on both sides, in their drafting of tax legislation. Such experts
include, for instance, lawyers with decades of experience in various
aspects of tax law practice. 120
The offices of legislative counsel in both the House and Senate
also play a key role in drafting tax legislation. Generally, these offices
work with congressional members and committees to turn Congress’s
policy preferences into “clear, concise, and legally effective legislative
language.” 121 As Wade Ballou, Legislative Counsel of the House of
Representatives, has described, it takes years of specialized training for
116. See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REV. 377, 377 (2017)
(highlighting some of these features).
117. An example of this phenomenon can be found in § 721(a) of the Code, which purports to
confer no recognition of gain or loss on contribution to a partnership, a rule that has numerous
exceptions that follow throughout the partnership tax rules.
118. About Us: Overview, JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/B27E-6NSV].
119. Committee Members, JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/committeemembers/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/5HPY-W488]; Current Staff, JOINT COMM.
ON
TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/current-staff/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/95L3-C6N4].
120. Ryan McCrimmon & Peter Cohn, End of an Era on Senate Finance as Longtime Staffer
Departs, ROLL CALL (May 23, 2018, 5:02 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2018/05/23/end-of-an-eraon-senate-finance-as-longtime-staffer-departs/ [https://perma.cc/WH35-QA4V].
121. HOUSE OFF. OF LEGIS. COUNS., https://legcounsel.house.gov/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/3W3D-Q7ME]; SENATE OFF. OF LEGIS. COUNS., https://www.slc.senate.gov/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/X7C3-S8Y9].
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lawyers to be trained as legislative counsel drafters, and complex areas
of law such as tax legislation “require considerably longer
mentorships.” 122
Part of Legislative Counsel’s role is to bring tax law into
conformity with long-standing tax law drafting conventions, including
drafting practices and terms of art that would not occur to non-tax-law
experts. As a result, Legislative Counsel follows drafting conventions
that derive from as early as the 1950s, with manuals from the 1980s
keeping track of these practices and perpetuating them further. 123 As
of yet, tax law drafters have not attempted to update the Code to make
it more compatible with modern modes of communication, such as
programming technology. 124
When this group of tax law experts drafts the tax law, their goal
is not to make it readable for taxpayers. Tax law drafters are concerned
with accurately and carefully translating congressional preferences into
tax legislation. 125 This is an extremely difficult job in and of itself,
especially given many external constraints such as time pressure and
political interference in a deliberative drafting process. 126 Almost
certainly owing in part to the difficulty of meeting even this principal
goal, tax legislation drafters do not expect the vast majority of
taxpayers to be able to read the tax law they draft. 127 Rather, tax
legislative drafters have indicated that they are drafting for
constituencies of other experts, including sophisticated tax advisors, the
Treasury Department, and TurboTax, who will then translate the law
for taxpayers. 128 Perhaps most strikingly, one tax legislative drafter has
suggested that tax legislation drafters are drafting the Code for each
other as a means of impressing those who might serve as potential
employers or colleagues in future contexts. 129 Another tax law drafter
similarly has suggested that the Code-drafting process was “inward
focused” and staffers “are writing for themselves.” 130

122. Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Legis. Branch
Appropriations, 116th Cong. 7 (2021) (statement of E. Wade Ballou, Jr., Legislative Counsel, Office
of the Legislative Counsel, United States House of Reps.).
123. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 2, at 1348.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1295. The majority of tax legislation drafters interviewed “did not pay much
attention to how a statute was formulated, and did not think it mattered, as long as the intended
rule was accurately articulated.” Id.
126. Cf., e.g., Victor Fleischer, The State of America’s Tax Institutions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (2018) (lamenting the difficulties of the tax legislative process).
127. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 2, at 1318.
128. Id. at 1317–18.
129. Id. at 1318.
130. Id.
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The mindset that the Code is written by experts and for experts,
without an expectation that most taxpayers will be able to use it directly
to fill out tax returns, is evident in the final product—the Code itself.
Take, as just one example, the rate of taxation imposed on taxpayers.
This information, one of the seemingly most straightforward and
fundamental aspects of the tax law, is contained in section 1 of the
Code. 131 Yet it would be impossible for anyone who was not extremely
well-versed in the tax law to use section 1 of the Code to figure out what
rate of taxation applies. Section 1 begins with four different tax tables
that apply to individual taxpayers. 132 Knowing which table applies to a
specific taxpayer requires the taxpayer to understand complicated,
embedded terms, such as a “head of household,” a nonobvious term
defined by a different Code section. 133 Even after figuring out which rate
table applies, a taxpayer does not have any idea what rate of taxation
applies to that taxpayer. The rate tables offered in the beginning of
section 1 are only a snapshot in time. The rest of section 1 goes on to
say that the rate tables have to be modified to reflect legislative
concepts like phaseouts of certain rate brackets, 134 cost-of-living
adjustments, 135 special rates for unearned income of children, 136 the
capital gains rate (the provisions for which are extraordinarily lengthy
and convoluted and almost impossible to understand from the
provisions themselves), 137 and various legislative changes to the rate
tables that apply only in certain years 138 and which themselves are
subject to adjustment for things like inflation. 139
As complex as the Code is, it is also only a small part of the
formal tax law. As one Joint Committee on Taxation lawyer has
explained, the actual Code is just a small fraction, or around four
thousand pages, of the more than seventy thousand pages that is often
publicly cited as the length of the Code. 140 Much of the remainder of this

131. I.R.C. § 1.
132. Id. § 1(a)-(d). There is an additional table for estates and trusts. Id. § 1(e).
133. Id. §§ 1(b), 2(b).
134. Id. § 1(f)(8).
135. Id. § 1(f)(3).
136. Id. § 1(g).
137. Id. § 1(h).
138. Id. § 1(i), (j).
139. Id. § 1(j)(5)(C).
140. Andrew L. Grossman, Is the Tax Code Really 70,000 Pages Long?, SLATE (Apr. 14, 2014,
11:56 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/04/how-long-is-the-tax-code-it-is-far-shorterthan-70000-pages.html [https://perma.cc/JSX4-6YWK].
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more-than-seventy-thousand-page number includes the regulations
and case law that amplify, explain, and implement the Code. 141
The Regulations, which are drafted by tax experts at the
Treasury Department, 142 increase the complexity of the formal tax law
significantly. Treasury promulgates such regulations pursuant to
Congress’s explicit delegation that Treasury may “prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Code. 143 As the IRS
describes, the Regulations “pick up where the Internal Revenue
Code . . . leaves off by providing the official interpretation of the IRC by
the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” 144 The Regulations generally
multiply the length of a given Code section many times over. One
example relates to section 482 of the Code. The Code section itself,
which comprises a mere paragraph, provides Treasury discretion to
reallocate tax items between commonly controlled businesses if
necessary to “prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income.” 145 This one section of the Code has spawned a lengthy set of
regulations, which comprises one of the most complex regulatory
regimes. 146
As detailed as the Code and Regulations are, they nonetheless
leave many questions unanswered. Indeed, the extensive complexity of
the Code and Regulations seems, in some ways, to contribute to yet
more questions. 147 Case law helps to answer some of these questions,
thus introducing another important form of formal tax law. However,
using case law to understand what the tax law is would be extremely
difficult for anyone who is not a tax lawyer. On top of the difficulty of
finding and understanding the relevant cases for any tax law questions,
there are a number of different fora in which a tax case can be brought,
including the Tax Court. 148 Thus, understanding which cases apply to
a taxpayer requires understanding jurisdiction and controlling
opinions, complicated further by the fact that the IRS uses
141. Id. It also includes legislative history and commentary by the reporter (CCH Federal Tax
Reporter) that publishes the compilation.
DEP’T
OF
THE
TREASURY,
142. Tax
Legislative
Counsel,
U.S.
https://home.treasury.gov/about/offices/tax-policy/tax-legislative-counsel (last visited Jan. 11,
2022) [https://perma.cc/MY6Y-7QT7].
143. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
144. Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/privacy-disclosure/tax-code-regulations-and-official-guidance (last updated
Mar. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8LAS-DYNR].
145. I.R.C. § 482.
146. 2 ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES § 20:38,
Westlaw CCGSTRALL (database updated Nov. 2021).
147. Weisbach, supra note 64, at 871 (discussing complexity spirals).
148. Cf. Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835
(2014) (exploring the role of the Tax Court and resulting complexities).
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administrative announcements to indicate when it will or will not
acquiesce to a specific decision even in other jurisdictions. 149
B. Informal Tax Law
To assist taxpayers in their attempts to comply with the formal
tax law, the IRS offers a free, publicly accessible type of informal tax
law—tax guidance. 150 When the IRS issues tax guidance, it attempts to
explain the formal tax law to the general public through, among other
sources, IRS publications, 151 frequently asked questions on the IRS
website (“FAQs”), 152 information from IRS Taxpayer Assistance
Centers, 153 and the IRS’s online Interactive Tax Assistant. 154 In
drafting this guidance, the IRS often delivers statements that feature
“simplexity”—the presentation of complex formal law as though it is
simple and clear, despite the lack of actual simplification of the
underlying formal law. 155
Two legislative mandates may have influenced the proliferation
of IRS guidance. First, the IRS serves the dual missions of tax
enforcement and taxpayer customer service. Following the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 156 the IRS
officially revised its mission statement to include a commitment to
providing taxpayers with “top quality service.” 157 It subsequently
adopted a taxpayer bill of rights, later codified in statutory law,
providing that taxpayers have the “right to be informed.” 158 The IRS
has interpreted this right to include access to clear descriptions of the
149. IRM 36.3.1 (Sept. 10, 2017).
150. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer (last updated July 21,
2021) [https://perma.cc/7HWN-8Z4D].
151. Publications Online, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications (last
updated Jan. 11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/KL75-W53N].
152. Frequently
Asked
Questions
and
Answers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/faqs (last updated Nov. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/69SX-DEWJ].
153. Taxpayer Assistance Center (TAC) Locations Where In-Person Document Review Is
Provided, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/help/tac-locations-where-in-persondocument-verification-is-provided (last updated Apr. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HLH3-HKWD].
154. Interactive Tax Assistant (ITA), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/help/ita
(last updated Dec. 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CS7A-RBXQ]. For further discussion of ITA and
automated legal guidance more generally, see Blank & Osofsky, Automated, supra note 28.
155. Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 208.
156. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 1205, 112 Stat. 685, 722–23; see also Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS,
51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 980 (2003) (discussing the Act’s ramifications).
157. I.R.S. News Release IR-98-59 (Sept. 24, 1998).
158. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-ofrights (last updated Feb. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7C6H-BE6Y] (codified at I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)).
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formal tax law and all IRS forms and procedures. 159 Second, as
discussed earlier, the Plain Writing Act of 2010 applies to all federal
agencies and requires them to provide “plain language” explanations
and instructions that are “clear, concise, [and] well-organized.” 160 In
response, the IRS publicly committed to communicating with taxpayers
in clear and understandable terms on in its guidance, notices, and
forms. 161
This Part describes some of the major types of informal tax law.
It also describes how even though the informal tax law originates from
the IRS, it is often amplified through third-party sources.
IRS Publications. Each year, in order to help taxpayers meet
their tax compliance obligations, the IRS revises and distributes dozens
of “IRS publications.” 162 IRS Publication 17, Your Federal Income Tax,
for example, describes the general rules for filing an individual annual
tax return, IRS Form 1040. 163 As of 2021, this publication is 138 pages
and contains descriptions of the formal tax law, examples that apply
the law, and a variety of icons that indicate where taxpayers should
take extra caution, such as by retaining records. 164 In its introduction,
the IRS notes that the publication does not “cover every situation” and
“is not intended to replace the law or change its meaning.” 165 Other IRS
publications address topics such as reporting of tip income, sales of
personal residences, net operating losses for small business, and
charitable contributions, among many others. 166
When the IRS describes the formal tax law in plain language, it
often offers clear and simple statements that can present contested
formal tax law as a series of clear rules, add administrative gloss to the
formal tax law, and omit discussion of statutory and regulatory
exceptions to the formal tax law. 167 The IRS’s reliance on simplexity to
explain formal tax law in IRS publications often results in deviations
between the formal and the informal tax law. Sometimes these

159. I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-72 (June 10, 2014).
160. Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 3(3), 124 Stat. 2861, 2861.
161. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N 5206, PLAIN WRITING
ACT COMPLIANCE REPORT 2 (2015).
162. See Publications Online, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications
(last updated Mar. 4, 2022) [https://perma.cc/936S-G3UY]. For discussion, see Blank & Osofsky,
Simplexity, supra note 28, at 202–04.
163. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N 17, CATALOG NO.
10311G,
TAX
GUIDE
2021
(Dec.
2021),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JN9A-ZF7F].
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2.
166. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 162 (listing other such publications).
167. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 202–04.
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explanations, if followed, benefit taxpayers; at other times, they conflict
with taxpayers’ interests. 168
Frequently Asked Questions. When Congress enacts new tax
statutes, or when unexpected situations arise, the IRS often posts FAQs
and answers to its website to help taxpayers. During the first months
of 2020, the IRS issued 273 FAQs that addressed several timely topics,
including special tax credits that Congress enacted in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic and related economic crisis. 169 Commentators
often criticize the IRS for using the FAQ format to present contested or
novel interpretations of the formal tax law as though they are settled
law. 170 For instance, in 2020, when the IRS issued FAQs regarding
economic impact payments enacted by Congress that year, some critics
disputed the IRS’s answers regarding the treatment of payments
received by the spouses of recently deceased taxpayers and by
incarcerated individuals. 171 In addition, as the IRS posts FAQs to its
website, it may revise posted questions and answers without providing
taxpayers with explanation of the changes. As the National Taxpayer
Advocate has argued before Congress when criticizing the IRS’s
increasing use of FAQs, “FAQs can be changed, supplemented, and
amended without notice and public comment, unlike regulations.” 172
Taxpayer Assistance Centers and IRS Help Line. Other sources
of informal tax law are the “IRS assisters,” human customer service
168. For further examples, see id.
169. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE:
FISCAL YEAR 2021 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 48 n.13 (June 2020),
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/JRC21_FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5EP-BT7D].
170. See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, NTA Blog Post on “Protecting the Rights
of Taxpayers Who Rely on FAQs” Is Timely and Welcome, but Doesn’t Go Far Enough,
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (July 9, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/nta-blog-post-on-protectingthe-rights-of-taxpayers-who-rely-on-faqs-is-timely-and-welcome-but-doesnt-go-far-enough/
[https://perma.cc/P49K-AT79]; Leslie Book, Tax Administration and Racial Justice: The Illegal
Denial of Tax-Based Pandemic Relief to the Nation’s Incarcerated Population, 72 S.C. L. REV. 667
(2021); Nina Olson, IRS FAQs Can Be a Trap for the Unwary, TAXCONNECTIONS: TAX BLOG (July
28,
2017),
https://www.taxconnections.com/taxblog/irs-faqs-can-be-a-trap-for-the-unwary/
[https://perma.cc/D2Q3-KUPR]; Joint Hearing on Continued Oversight Over the Internal Revenue
Service Before the Subcomm. on Health Care, Benefits, & Admin. Rules & Subcomm. on Gov’t
Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Nina
E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, United States Department of the Treasury); Monte A.
Jackel, The Proper Role of FAQs, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (May 8, 2020),
https://procedurallytaxing.com/the-proper-role-of-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/ARP9-8QAB].
171. See infra notes 232–250 and accompanying text.
172. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 169, at 67. Following criticism of the IRS’s use of
FAQs during the COVID-19 pandemic, in June 2021, IRS officials commented that the IRS was in
the process of developing “a system to help people search for FAQs.” Allyson Versprille, IRS to
Address Concerns with FAQs in Announcement Soon, BLOOMBERG TAX (June 24, 2021, 1:21 PM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/irs-to-address-concerns-with-faqs-inannouncement-soon [https://perma.cc/W8RL-AMHU].
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representatives who answer taxpayers’ questions at Taxpayer
Assistance Centers and by phone over the IRS help line. 173 As of 2021,
taxpayers can make an appointment at a local Taxpayer Assistance
Center to ask both general tax law questions and questions about their
own specific circumstances. 174 The IRS provides training of the
“publication method” to IRS assisters, where it instructs these
representatives to answer questions by reiterating the IRS’s positions
in IRS publications. 175 The Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration has issued reports that document instances in which
responses from IRS assisters to the same taxpayer question have
diverged from one another. 176 As a result of these inconsistencies, the
IRS has focused its attention on ways to standardize and even automate
the guidance that IRS assisters provide to taxpayers. 177
Interactive Tax Assistant. Since 2010, the IRS has attempted to
respond to taxpayer inquiries using a form of automated legal guidance
through its website, the “Interactive Tax Assistant” (“ITA”). 178 As IRS
budget cuts and the events like the COVID-19 pandemic have limited
taxpayer access to human customer service representatives, the IRS
has increased its publicity of ITA as a major source of personalized tax
guidance. 179 When taxpayers access ITA through the IRS website, they
select a category of questions, such as “Can I Deduct My Medical and
Dental Expenses?” and then answer a series of questions provided by
ITA. 180 As the IRS describes ITA, this resource “can determine if a type
of income is taxable, if you’re eligible to claim certain credits, and if you
can deduct expenses on your tax return.” 181 Once taxpayers have
inputted their responses to a series of questions, ITA presents a screen
titled “Answers” (e.g., noting that a specific type of medical expense is
173. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153.
174. See id.
175. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NO. 200440-025, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE TAX RETURNS ARE CORRECTLY PREPARED AT
TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE CENTERS 11 (Dec. 2003).
176. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NO.
2011-40-043, THE INTERACTIVE TAX LAW ASSISTANT HELPS ASSISTORS PROVIDE ACCURATE
ANSWERS TO TAXPAYER INQUIRIES (Apr. 2011) (one such report).
177. See id. at 24.
178. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 154; see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NO. 2011-40-070, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
PROVIDES HELPFUL AND ACCURATE TAX LAW ASSISTANCE, BUT TAXPAYERS EXPERIENCE LENGTHY
WAIT TIMES TO SPEAK WITH ASSISTORS 15–17 (Aug. 2011) (history of ITA).
179. See, e.g., IRS News (@IRSnews), TWITTER (June 15, 2021, 3:01 PM)
https://twitter.com/IRSnews/status/1404876749809270785 [https://perma.cc/7E28-AKX]; IRS
Videos,
Interactive
Tax
Assistant,
YOUTUBE
(June
24,
2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dffgkaQcR68 [https://perma.cc/R5FB-X5JV].
180. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 154.
181. Id.
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“not a deductible expense”). 182 ITA offers taxpayers answers that are
tailored to “individual circumstances” 183 and that use friendly and
accessible language, such as second-person pronouns (e.g., “you” and
“your”). 184
While automated legal guidance such as ITA can deliver
accurate answers to simple questions regarding issues like filing
deadlines and types of forms, it can also present answers that differ
from the underlying formal tax law. For example, ITA informs
taxpayers that items like artificial teeth expenses and lead paint
removal expenses qualify as deductible medical expenses, even though,
in many cases, the Code, Regulations, and case law reach different
results. 185 The IRS’s use of simplexity in automated legal guidance is
especially powerful and persuasive because it offers tax guidance that
is personalized (specific to the inquiring taxpayer), nonqualified
(omitting discussion of contradictory exceptions and other rules), and
instantaneous (sparing taxpayers from reading other authorities). 186
In addition to the guidance received directly from the IRS,
taxpayers may also encounter the informal tax law through third-party
sources, some of which are described briefly below.
Tax Preparation Software. Each year, tens of millions of
taxpayers use software, such as Intuit’s TurboTax, to complete and file
their tax returns with the IRS. 187 In many cases, the advice that
TurboTax and its online tax professionals provide is identical to the
statements in IRS publications, including IRS statements that deviate
from the formal tax law. 188 By following the IRS’s position from the
informal tax law, the tax preparation software reduces the likelihood of
IRS audits of its users. 189 Some firms that sell tax preparation software
promise that, in the event of an IRS audit, they will provide access to

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28.
186. See id.
187. See Intuit Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 31, 2020) (reporting over fifty million
customers); KUSH PATEL, IBISWORLD, REP. NO. 54121D, TAX PREPARATION SERVICES IN THE US
(Aug.
2019),
https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/54121D%20Tax%20Preparation%20Services%20in%20the%20US
%20Industry%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZS4-PN6K] (providing an overview of tax
preparation services in the United States).
188. For examples, see Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 229–31 (discussing
TurboTax examples).
189. For discussion, see id. at 231.
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trained tax professionals and refunds of the purchase price. 190 This type
of guarantee further encourages sellers of tax preparation software to
avoid conflicting with the IRS position in its informal guidance.
Tax Advice Publications. The informal tax law may also
influence taxpayers indirectly, such as through descriptions that
appear in popular tax advice publications written by authors outside of
the government. Many of the authors of these publications frequently
refer to statements and examples from the IRS that originally appeared
in IRS publications or on its website. 191 Others repeat the IRS position
as expressed in IRS publications even if this is not necessarily
consistent with the formal tax law. 192 Third-party tax advice
publications such as these expand the reach of the informal tax law
beyond the direct efforts of the IRS.
Tax Accountants and Other Return Preparers. Finally, even
when taxpayers turn to tax accountants and other return preparers to
complete their tax returns, they engage, indirectly, with the informal
tax law. While legal education for tax lawyers focuses on statutes,
regulations and case law, many educational programs for accountants
and other tax-return preparers instead teach them to follow the IRS’s
statements in IRS publications. 193 When individuals seek to receive
“enrolled agent” status from the IRS, enabling them to represent
taxpayers before the Agency, they must pass a three-part
comprehensive exam developed by the IRS or show that they have
gained experience as former IRS employees. 194 The exam contains
questions based on some of the most widely read IRS publications. 195

190. See,
e.g.,
TurboTax
Online
Guarantees,
INTUIT
TURBOTAX,
https://turbotax.intuit.com/corp/guarantees/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/R4K2VYTU].
191. See, e.g., J.K. LASSER INST., J.K. LASSER’S YOUR INCOME TAX 2021 (2020) (example of
popular tax advice publication referring to IRS materials); see also MARTHA MAEDA, HOW TO OPEN
& OPERATE A FINANCIALLY SUCCESSFUL INDEPENDENT RECORD LABEL 84 (2012).
192. See, e.g., Bruce N. Edwards, Tax Implications of Home Ownership (Portfolio No. 594-3rd),
Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BL) (2021) (example of expert secondary source repeating IRS position).
193. See, e.g., Loc. Gov’t Servs. Div., Basic Accounting Workshop, GA. DEP’T OF REVENUE 83
(rev.
Aug.
2017),
https://dor.georgia.gov/document/training-program/basic-accountingworkshop/download [https://perma.cc/9BR6-AKAY] (referencing the IRS’s “Publication 946”
(regarding accelerated depreciation deductions)).
194. See Internal Revenue Service: Enrolled Agent Special Enrollment Examination,
PROMETRIC
5–20,
https://www.prometric.com/sites/default/files/IRS/IRS-SEE-CandidateInformation-Bulletin.pdf (rev. Mar. 1, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3TFU-69M2] (Candidate
Information Bulletin detailing the exam requirements).
195. See Enrolled Agents – Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/enrolled-agents/enrolled-agents-frequently-asked-questions
(last updated Mar. 1, 2022) [https://perma.cc/VB57-WAUS].
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C. The Role of Tax Lawyers
Having established that there are different types of tax law—
formal and informal—the next question is which taxpayers can access
these different types of law? Do all taxpayers have equal access to the
formal tax law?
As an initial matter, only highly specialized tax law experts,
namely tax lawyers, have clear access to the formal tax law. As
discussed previously, the formal tax law is written so that only tax law
experts are likely to be able to use it to answer tax law questions. 196 On
top of this expertise limitation, there is also a more practical one: even
when nonlawyer tax professionals, such as accountants, are able to
access and use the formal tax law to answer tax questions, their ability
to do so is circumscribed by rules about the unauthorized practice of
law. While the boundaries of “practice of law” are not always clear,
accountants are clearly limited in their ability to make interpretations
of complex tax statutes, regulations, and cases. 197 As the Supreme
Court of Minnesota explained,
[w]hen an accountant or other layman who is employed to prepare an income tax return
is faced with difficult or doubtful questions of the interpretation or application of statutes,
administrative regulations and rulings, court decisions, or general law, it is his duty to
leave the determination of such questions to a lawyer. 198

This unique ability of tax lawyers to use formal tax law raises a
question about which taxpayers use what type of tax professionals, if
any. Tax return filing statistics reveal that most taxpayers file their tax
returns using some form of assistance, whether in the form of paid
preparer assistance or tax preparation software. Self-prepared tax
returns (which are filed without the assistance of a paid preparer or tax
preparation software) have been trending steadily downward, falling in
recent years to around four percent. 199 Instead of self-preparing, around
forty percent of taxpayers use online tax filing software, and around
fifty-six percent of taxpayers use paid preparers. 200 Over half of all paid

196. See supra notes 118–149 and accompanying text.
197. Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the
Bar Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 605–16 (2000) (exploring case law regarding
what constitutes unauthorized practice of law by accountants).
198. Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 1951).
199. Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-up: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 72 TAX L. REV. 59, 91 (2018).
200. Id.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N 55-B,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2020, at 2 (June 2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p55b.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5S2-J33B].
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preparers are unenrolled tax preparers who are not lawyers or
accountants and are not subject to regulation by the IRS. 201
There is less data available about what types of taxpayers use
what type of assistance, though there is some indication that lowincome taxpayers often use tax preparers from large, national taxreturn preparation chains such as Jackson Hewitt and H&R Block, as
well as smaller, independent, unenrolled tax-return preparers. 202 There
is troubling evidence about the extent to which these preparers even
file accurate tax returns. As for the national chain tax-return preparers,
a recent GAO study found, in a study of commercial paid preparers with
ten or more locations, that nearly all prepared returns were incorrect to
some degree. 203 The situation with independent, unenrolled preparers
is even more worrisome. During a time in which the IRS tried
(unsuccessfully) to regulate unenrolled tax-return preparers, twentysix percent of them failed a test designed to measure basic tax return
filing competency. 204 The Taxpayer Advocate has described that
[w]hen one visits a hair salon, the hair stylist will have a certificate displayed, which
attests to the fact that the stylist has undergone the training necessary to obtain the
license. In contrast, there is no such guarantee that an unenrolled tax return preparer
has passed any exam, continues to engage in ongoing education, or meets any other
minimum standard of competency to prepare federal tax returns. 205

Putting aside questions as to filing accuracy, what is clear is that
neither large tax return preparation companies nor unenrolled
preparers are authorized to engage in legal analysis of the formal tax
law. 206 Indeed, in some ways, what these return preparers are doing is
on the opposite end of the spectrum. In almost all cases, these return
preparers are using tax-return software themselves to take the
taxpayers’ data and turn it into a tax return, 207 albeit often
201. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE:
2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 105 (Feb. 2019), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/ARC18_Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R3F-LWBZ] (“[Most Serious
Problem] #7: Return Preparer Oversight”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, PUBL’N 947, CATALOG NO. 13392P, PRACTICE BEFORE THE IRS AND POWER OF
ATTORNEY 3 (rev. Feb. 2018), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p947 [https://perma.cc/AM9Y9BKK].
202. Goldin, supra note 199, at 87–88.
203. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-467T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS:
IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 9–12 (Apr. 2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-467t.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHM8-TQSN].
204. Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing on H.R.
1570 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (statement of John A. Koskinen,
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service).
205. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 201, at 106.
206. See supra notes 197–198.
207. Lawrence Zelenak, Essay, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX
L. 91, 94–95 (2010).
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inaccurately. 208 Low-income taxpayers are eligible to perform this exact
function for free themselves using the IRS Free File program, though,
for a variety of reasons, a huge number of eligible low-income taxpayers
nonetheless pay preparers or pay for the software. 209
Tax lawyers, who are unique among tax professionals in their
ability to engage in legal analysis of the formal tax law to advise
taxpayers about ambiguous legal questions, make up a tiny fraction of
tax professionals who file tax returns. The GAO has documented that,
of all paid tax-return preparers, tax lawyers only comprise 29,214,
whereas there are 209,628 CPAs, 48,573 enrolled agents, and 374,812
unenrolled preparers. 210 This makes sense based on what a “paid
preparer” is for these purposes. Attorneys are not “paid preparers” who
must identify themselves as such with the IRS unless they “prepar[e]
for compensation . . . all or a substantial portion of any return of tax or
any claim for refund.” 211 Thus, tax lawyers whose main function is
analyzing or interpreting the formal tax law (as well as other sources of
law), not filing tax returns, are not going to be counted as paid
preparers in the studies about who files returns in what ways.
It is important to emphasize the extent to which we lack
empirical data (an issue to which we will return in Part III, below) about
use of tax lawyers. There is no tax return on which people or businesses
must report they received the advice of a tax lawyer. There is no
government documentation of, or even government attempt to
document, such data.
However, there is useful, circumstantial evidence. Tax lawyers
cost a lot of money. Whereas paid preparers tend to charge in the
hundreds of dollars to prepare a tax return 212 and tax software costs a
fraction of that price, 213 tax lawyers cost on average around $200 to
$400 an hour, though tax lawyers at large firms or in major cities can
charge substantially more. 214 One would have to have a very large
208. See supra notes 197–198.
209. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NO.
2020-40-009, COMPLEXITY AND INSUFFICIENT OVERSIGHT OF THE FREE FILE PROGRAM RESULT IN
LOW TAXPAYER PARTICIPATION (Feb. 2020), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6768599TIGTA-Free-File-audit.html [https://perma.cc/E7LM-V89G] (exploring this and other aspects of
the Free File controversy).
210. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 203, at 6.
211. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-15(a) (2022).
212. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 203, at 19–20.
213. For instance, Intuit TurboTax’s most popular paid option was priced at fifty-nine dollars
in 2021. See INTUIT TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/ (last visited
Mar. 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/YY33-ZRJX].
214. See, e.g., How Much Does a Tax Attorney Cost, CROSS L. GRP.: BLOG (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.crosslawgroup.com/blog/hiring-tax-attorney-worth-cost/
[https://perma.cc/6BAC9YGC]; Jen K., Average Cost of Tax Attorney Fees, THERVO, https://thervo.com/costs/average-cost-
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amount of tax liability at stake to justify paying a tax lawyer’s fee, and
the larger the amount at stake, the more valuable the tax lawyer may
be. It stands to reason that those with higher income and/or greater
wealth are more likely to hire tax attorneys.
Moreover, even when members of the public contemplate hiring
a tax attorney, it is often for the purpose of resolving a dispute with the
IRS. For instance, the website SuperMoney suggests that common
reasons to hire a tax attorney include “You are being audited. You need
to negotiate a settlement with the IRS. You receive a notice from the
IRS about a tax issue . . . .” 215 Left off the list is tax planning in advance
of filing a tax return or interpreting the tax law as advantageously as
possible in order to take the best possible position for the taxpayer.
Yet this exact type of planning is what high-end tax lawyers do
for very high-income and/or wealthy individuals and businesses. Cleary
Gottlieb, a major global law firm, for instance, explains that its tax
practice “provides clients with sophisticated and practical advice on tax
planning, tax strategies for transactions, cross-border issues and the
resolution of difficult tax controversies.” 216 Likewise, Paul, Weiss,
another major law firm, describes that “Identifying obscure but
potentially costly tax issues is a skill. Solving them in the context of our
client’s goals is an art, and one that Paul, Weiss practices at the highest
level. . . . [O]ur tax lawyers help clients solve problems, avoid pitfalls
and uncover hidden value in all types of transactions.” 217 As Professor
Heather Field describes, in this transactional context, tax lawyers “will
inform the client about the tax consequences that arise from the
transaction’s structure, advise the client about opportunities for
improving the tax treatment, and counsel the client about the risks and
benefits of different approaches . . . .” 218 In so doing, tax law firms often
provide high-income and wealthy individuals and businesses with
written tax opinions, which express varying levels of confidence that a
client’s tax position is consistent with the tax law. 219 The opinions can

of-tax-attorney-fees (last visited Mar. 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/3L9D-TD6F]; What Is the Average
Cost of Hiring a Tax Attorney?, SUPERMONEY, https://www.supermoney.com/what-average-costhiring-tax-attorney/ (last updated Apr. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6ZF3-S36P].
215. SUPERMONEY, supra note 214.
216. Tax, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/practice-landing/tax (last visited
Mar. 15, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9MFC-9CBN].
217. Tax, PAUL, WEISS, https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/transactional/tax (last visited
Mar. 15, 2022) [https://perma.cc/BAC5-Q9RQ].
218. Heather M. Field, Tax Lawyers as Tax Insurance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2111, 2121
(2019).
219. Id. at 2122–26 (describing tax opinions).
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provide the clients with protection from certain tax penalties in the
event of a deficiency assertion by the IRS following an audit. 220
D. Access to Justice
The two tiers of formal and informal tax law threaten equitable
access to justice. Most taxpayers have no access to the formal tax law.
Rather, they generally rely on informal tax guidance and tax
preparation software (whether directly, or through paid, non-taxlawyer preparers) to prepare their tax returns. On the other hand, highend tax lawyers engage in extensive, pre-tax return planning for very
high-income and/or wealthy individuals and businesses, thus providing
these taxpayers access to the formal law and the most advantageous
tax positions.
Although informal tax guidance is written in plain language and
deemphasizes technical terminology, it has several important
weaknesses compared to the formal tax law. First, when the formal tax
law is ambiguous, the IRS sometimes takes positions in the informal
tax law that are disadvantageous to taxpayers. While there might be an
argument to the contrary rooted in formal tax law, taxpayers who follow
the informal guidance are bound by the disadvantageous approach as a
practical matter. Second, unlike the formal tax law, the informal tax
law does not bind the IRS by requiring it to take positions during audits
and tax controversies that are consistent with those that the Agency
has expressed in its guidance publications and on its website. 221 Third,
in contrast to the Code, Regulations, and case law, informal tax law that
appears in sources such as ITA and statements in IRS publications does
not constitute the type of authority that taxpayers can use to establish
a “reasonable basis” defense against some of the most common civil tax
penalties. 222 Finally, while tax lawyers may offer planning advice before
taxpayers engage in transactions or claim tax positions, the government
does not offer similar services when it distributes informal tax law. 223
This Part offers three examples to highlight these differences between
informal and formal tax law and how these differences exacerbate
inequitable access to justice.

220. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003); see also Field, supra note 218, at 2124
n.66.
221. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 194–95 (2000); see also infra notes 261–266 and
accompanying text.
222. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2003); infra notes 268–270 and
accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 275–285 and accompanying text.
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1. Unambiguous Informal Tax Law
In many cases, informal tax guidance can deliver answers to
taxpayers that are unambiguous and easy to understand. For example,
consider a married couple with no children who are trying to determine
whether they are required to file IRS Form 1040, the annual federal
income tax return, in 2020. That year, the couple had gross income of
$30,000. By visiting ITA on the IRS website, the couple can select “Do I
Need to File a Tax Return?” and then answer a series of questions
regarding issues such as their filing status, their age and disability
status, and the amount of their aggregate gross income. 224 After
answering these questions, the couple receives an answer: the couple is
required to file IRS Form 1040 for 2020 because their gross income is
equal to, or exceeds, $24,800. 225
This example illustrates how informal tax law, such as ITA, can
provide correct guidance to taxpayers clearly and efficiently. The
informal tax law in this example matches the underlying formal tax law
exactly. 226 Even if the taxpayers had consulted with a tax lawyer who
reviewed the applicable Code provision and IRS revenue procedure
stating the annual inflation adjustments directly (unlikely for this type
of common question), they would have received the same answer that
ITA provided. For straightforward questions like those regarding filing
deadlines and requirements, taxpayers who consult IRS publications or
the IRS website can access accurate tax law information quickly and
without financial cost.
2. Taxpayer-Unfavorable Informal Tax Law
When the formal tax law features legal ambiguity, on the other
hand, the IRS often provides taxpayers with informal tax law that may
appear clear but is also adverse to taxpayers’ interests. For instance, in
March 2020, as a result of the economic disruption caused by the
COVID-19 public health crisis, Congress enacted the CARES Act,
which, among other relief, provided “economic impact payments”
(advance refundable tax credits) to joint-filing married taxpayers, as
long as their adjusted gross income did not exceed certain thresholds. 227
Following confusion regarding the eligibility requirements for these
224. See Do I Need to File a Tax Return?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/help/ita/do-i-need-to-file-a-tax-return (last updated Dec. 10, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/8W39-TWAE].
225. See id.
226. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A)(iv).
227. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2201, 134
Stat. 281, 335 (2020).
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payments, the IRS posted a list of FAQs on its website, including the
following, “Q10: Does someone who has died qualify for the
Payment?” 228 By this point in time, some deceased taxpayers’ estates
and family members had been receiving payments. 229 The IRS
attempted to respond to this situation by stating in its posted answer:
A10: No. A Payment made to someone who died before receipt of the Payment should be
returned to the IRS by following the instructions in the Q&A about repayments. Return
the entire Payment unless the Payment was made to joint filers and one spouse had not
died before receipt of the Payment, in which case, you only need to return the portion of
the Payment made on account of the decedent. 230

While the IRS’s guidance was unequivocal, several
commentators, and even some senior IRS employees, questioned the
IRS’s interpretation of the formal tax law. Shortly after the IRS posted
its FAQ regarding payments to deceased taxpayers, former National
Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson analyzed the requirements of the newly
enacted statute and criticized the IRS’s claim that individuals were
ineligible to receive payment if they were deceased in 2020, even though
they had been eligible individuals in 2018 or 2019. 231 She also noted
that in 2008, when Congress enacted stimulus legislation during the
financial crisis and used the same statutory language as in the CARES
Act, the IRS adopted a contrary position in its FAQs regarding
payments of stimulus checks to deceased taxpayers. 232 Several tax
practitioners agreed that the statutory language provided that as long
as taxpayers were “eligible individuals” in 2018 or 2019, they should be
entitled to the payments in 2020, even if, in 2020, they were deceased. 233
Commentators also suggested that, in issuing its guidance, the IRS had
responded to political pressure following President Trump’s and
228. See Nina Olson, The Uncertainty of Death and Taxes: Economic Stimulus Payments to
Deceased Individuals, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (May 11, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/theuncertainty-of-death-and-taxes-economic-stimulus-payments-to-deceased-individuals/
[https://perma.cc/S7NH-BF49].
229. See Kate Davidson and Richard Rubin, Stimulus Checks Sent to Dead Relatives Should
ST.
J.
(Apr.
28,
2020,
3:48
PM),
Be
Returned,
Mnuchin
Says,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/stimulus-checks-sent-to-dead-relatives-should-be-returnedmnuchin-says-11588103323 [https://perma.cc/RCN5-NPFK]; William Cummings, ‘You’re Not
Supposed to Keep that Payment’: Mnuchin Wants Stimulus Money Given to Dead Taxpayers
Returned, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/29/steve-mnuchinwants-stimulus-given-dead-people-returned/3046434001/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2020, 4:33 PM)
[https://perma.cc/N48K-HCAB].
230. See Olson, supra note 228 (discussing I.R.C. § 6428).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., David M. Fogel, Must Economic Impact Payments to Deceased Individuals Be
Returned?, TAX NOTES FED., June 8, 2020, at 1719, 1721 (discussing application of I.R.C. § 6428 to
deceased taxpayers); Patrick Thomas, Analyzing the IRS FAQs on Incarcerated and Non-Resident
Taxpayers, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (May 12, 2020), https://procedurallytaxing.com/analyzing-theirs-faqs-on-incarcerated-and-non-resident-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/Z9L7-SGVF] (same).
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Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s public condemnation of media reports
regarding economic impact payments to deceased taxpayers. 234 Months
later, a report by the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (“TIGTA”) found that IRS management initially had not
prevented the distribution of economic impact payments to taxpayers
who had died because they believed that the CARES Act did “not
prohibit the issuance of payments to deceased individuals.” 235
Even though the IRS’s FAQ lacked the force of formal tax law, 236
as a practical matter, for many taxpayers, it was binding. Many
taxpayers who received payments on behalf of deceased taxpayers read
the IRS’s posted FAQ, which included the imperative statement
“Return the entire Payment,” and did as they were instructed. 237
According to TIGTA, within six months of the IRS’s posting of its FAQ
on its website in May 2020, taxpayers returned nearly sixty thousand
economic impact payments, totaling more than $72 million, that the
IRS had previously distributed to deceased taxpayers. 238 The IRS’s
informal guidance in this case caused many taxpayers to take actions
that were contrary to the financial interests of deceased taxpayers’
estates.
In contrast, wealthy individuals and businesses who have access
to the formal tax law through sophisticated advisors are much less
likely to be practically bound by IRS guidance that is disadvantageous
to taxpayers. For example, under the reportable transaction disclosure
rules, the IRS may designate potentially abusive tax strategies as
“listed transactions” or “transactions of interest,” thus requiring
taxpayers and their advisors to disclose information regarding their
participation in these strategies. 239 In CIC Services, LLC v. IRS, 240 a tax
advisor in Tennessee who specialized in advising clients regarding
micro-captive insurance strategies attempted to prevent the IRS from
234. See, e.g., Sarah Skidmore Sell, Dead Taxpayers Got Relief Checks. Can Survivors Keep
Them?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/lifestyle-steven-mnuchindonald-trump-virus-outbreak-business-a20f6dfd189142d3df5b7b780145e4f8
[https://perma.cc/7RXR-YFMT].
235. Subsequent legislation, which provided for second and third rounds of economic impact
payments, provided more explicit rules regarding deceased taxpayers.
236. See, e.g., Fargo v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB
Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 240.
237. Olson, supra note 228.
238. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REP. NO. 202146-034,
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
ECONOMIC
IMPACT
PAYMENTS
6
(May
2021),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2021reports/202146034fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJZ5VCE8].
239. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d) (as amended in 2010) (taxpayer disclosure); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6111-3(d)(1) (as amended in 2011) (material advisor disclosure).
240. 141 S. Ct. 1582, 1588 (2021).
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designating this type of tax strategy as a “transaction of interest.” 241
The Agency had done so in an “IRS Notice,” a typical form of informal
guidance. 242 However, the tax advisor in CIC Services was able to
provide his clients an option that the relatives of the deceased recipients
of the economic impact payments lacked: the ability to use formal law
to fight against the IRS’s informal guidance. In CIC Services, the tax
advisor’s primary argument was that the IRS had not completed the
notice-and-comment process required by the Administrative Procedure
Act in designating the tax strategy as a transaction of interest. 243 In
2021, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision for the tax
advisor. 244 In this example, taxpayers who had access to sophisticated
legal counsel were able to benefit from the formal law, in this case
rooted in administrative law and its interaction with the tax law, to
fight against the IRS’s informal guidance.
In one recent case, taxpayers without significant economic
resources were able to challenge the IRS’s informal interpretation of the
formal tax law in court successfully. 245 In 2020, the IRS posted an FAQ
regarding the first round of economic impact payments under the
CARES Act in which it stated that incarcerated individuals were
ineligible to receive payments. 246 Later that year, plaintiffs in Scholl v.
Mnuchin brought a class action to represent affected incarcerated
individuals. 247 The district court in Scholl agreed with the plaintiffs’
arguments that incarcerated taxpayers were eligible to receive
economic impact payments under the CARES Act and enjoined the IRS
from withholding the payments to these taxpayers. 248
While Scholl was a victory for the taxpayers, it is not
representative of most middle- or low-income taxpayers’ experiences
with informal tax guidance and the IRS. First, this case involved
241. Id.; IRS Notice 2016-66, 2016-47 I.R.B. (designating strategy as transaction of interest).
242. IRS Notice 2016-66, 2016-47 I.R.B.
243. CIC Servs., 141 S. Ct. at 1588; IRS Notice 2016-66, 2016-47 I.R.B.
244. CIC Servs., 141 S. Ct. at 1594. For further discussion, see Kristen A. Parillo, Supreme
Court’s CIC Services Opinion Clarifies Scope of AIA, TAX NOTES (May 18, 2021),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/litigation-and-appeals/supreme-courts-cicservices-opinion-clarifies-scope-aia/2021/05/18/60lcw [https://perma.cc/2RVb-N7QK]; and Daniel
Hemel, Treasury Needs To Act Fast To Save the Tax-Shelter Disclosure Regime, SUBSTANCE OVER
FORM (May 18, 2021), https://substanceoverform.substack.com/p/treasury-needs-to-act-fast-tosave [https://perma.cc/Z6LL-VFMF]. The Court’s holding in CIC Services is consistent with the
arguments presented by Professor Kristin Hickman in her amicus brief in this case. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Petitioners at 2–19, CIC Servs., LLC
v. IRS, 141 S. Ct. 1582 (2021) (No. 19-930).
245. Scholl v. Mnuchin, 494 F. Supp. 3d 661, 692 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
246. Id. at 679.
247. Id. at 669.
248. Id. at 692.
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taxpayers—incarcerated
individuals—who
shared
common
characteristics and faced similar legal issues in sufficient amount to be
certified as a class and participate in a class action lawsuit. 249 In other
cases of taxpayer-unfavorable IRS informal guidance, taxpayers are
generally unable to participate in class actions because their factual or
legal circumstances are too divergent. Second, the taxpayers in this case
were represented by a prominent public interest organization and law
firm that contributed pro bono legal services. 250 In most cases,
taxpayers without significant economic resources do not have similar
opportunities to challenge the IRS’s informal tax guidance. As a result,
unlike in Scholl, most middle- and low-income taxpayers are practically
bound by informal tax guidance, even if it disadvantages them.
3. Taxpayer-Favorable Informal Tax Law
The IRS also uses informal tax guidance to offer rules and
interpretations that, if followed by taxpayers, would appear to benefit
taxpayers’ interests. Recent examples of taxpayer-favorable informal
IRS guidance include the IRS’s FAQs regarding economic impact
payments under the CARES Act for children who turned seventeen in
2020; 251 FAQs addressing possible ways that taxpayers may calculate
the basis in cryptocurrency for purposes of calculating gains upon sale
or exchange of this type of property; 252 and FAQs regarding
requirements for a child to count as a qualifying child for purposes of
the child tax credit and the earned income tax credit. 253 In addition, the

249. Id. at 679.
250. See Lieff Cabraser and Equal Justice Society File Class Action Challenging Trump
Administration’s Theft of Congressionally-Allocated Pandemic Relief Funds from Incarcerated
Persons and the Families They Support, LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN (Aug. 1, 2020),
https://www.lieffcabraser.com/2020/08/lieff-cabraser-and-equal-justice-society-file-class-actionchallenging-trump-administrations-theft-of-congressionally-allocated-pandemic-relief-fundsfrom-incarcerated-persons-and-the-familie/ [https://perma.cc/4PJH-AM9X].
251. For discussion, see Olson, supra note 228.
252. Q40 under Frequently Asked Questions on Virtual Currency Transactions, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV.
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/frequently-askedquestions-on-virtual-currency-transactions (last updated Jan. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/RH2666UB]. For discussion, see Kristen A. Parillo, IRS’s Cryptocurrency FAQs Could Become More
Formal Guidance, TAX NOTES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayfederal/cryptocurrency/irss-cryptocurrency-faqs-could-become-more-formal-guidance/2020/04/08/
[https://perma.cc/9B4S-AC42].
253. Frequently Asked Questions: Qualifying Child Rules 1, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
https://www.irs.gov/faqs/earned-income-tax-credit/qualifying-child-rules/qualifying-child-rules-1
(last updated Jan. 1, 2022) [https://perma.cc/9UFB-X4M6]. For discussion, see 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC.
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: FISCAL YEAR 2020
OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS, 55–56 (June 2019), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/JRC20_Volume1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KH-YA25]
(“IRS’s
own
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IRS has offered seemingly taxpayer-favorable simplifications of the
formal tax law in IRS publications and through automated legal
guidance on topics ranging from the deductibility of business clothing
to the tax treatment of home mortgage expenses. 254
While taxpayer-favorable positions in informal tax guidance
may seem to benefit taxpayers, this guidance is not legally binding on
the IRS and taxpayers cannot rely upon it to defend against some of the
most common civil tax penalties. As a result, taxpayers rely upon it at
their peril. While the IRS may directly contradict or reject its own IRS
publication or FAQs only occasionally, 255 it is more likely that the IRS
could challenge a taxpayer’s interpretation of a seemingly taxpayerfavorable statement contained in informal IRS guidance. For an
illustration, consider a home contractor who builds and renovates
homes at the request of customers. After years of building homes one at
a time, the contractor is considering whether to pursue an online
Master of Business Administration (“MBA”) to learn more about
marketing and management. Eventually, the contractor hopes to
oversee teams of builders who will conduct the construction work for
many clients simultaneously. The contractor questions whether the
costs of the MBA would be tax deductible. To answer this question, he
visits the IRS website and ITA. ITA asks the contractor several
questions, such as “Were the expenses attributable to a trade or
business or employment already established at the time the education
was undertaken?” 256 The contractor answers “yes,” as he is already in
the business of constructing homes. ITA then asks, “Was the education
necessary in order to meet the minimum educational requirements of
your trade or business or your employer’s trade or business?” 257 The
contractor answers “no” because he does not believe that an MBA is a
minimum educational requirement for the type of marketing and
management role that he hopes to create within his own existing home
construction business. After answering a few more questions, the
contractor receives an affirmative answer from ITA: “Your work-related
education expenses are deductible.” 258

established procedures and public announcements demonstrate that its implementation of
IRC § 24(h)(7) is not consistent with a ‘valid or neutral law of general applicability.’ ”).
254. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28.
255. See, e.g., Bobrow v. Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1110 (2014) (permitting IRS to disregard
statements in IRS Publication 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (“IRAs”)).
256. Are My Work-Related Education Expenses Deductible?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/help/ita/are-my-work-related-education-expenses-deductible (last updated
Aug. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/EK75-6DUM].
257. Id.
258. Id.
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Although ITA appears to deliver the answer that the contractor
hoped he would receive, if the IRS audits the contractor, it may
challenge the deduction for MBA tuition and related expenses. There
are dozens of cases where the IRS rejected taxpayers’ attempts to
deduct this type of education expense, with the IRS losing some cases
but prevailing in others. 259 Yet in this example, ITA asked the taxpayer
a series of binary questions. It did not ask any follow-up questions that
could have explored the taxpayer’s rationale for pursuing the MBA, the
type of trade or business he had been conducting, and how he would use
the knowledge he would gain during his MBA studies in the future.
Nonetheless, ITA provided the taxpayer with a clear statement that he
could deduct the education expenses on a screen featuring a heading
that contained the word “Answer.” 260
If the IRS were to audit and challenge the contractor’s ordinary
and necessary business expense deduction for his MBA education
expenses, the contractor would not be able to argue that the IRS should
be bound by statements provided by ITA. The courts have consistently
held that administrative guidance cannot alter the meaning of the
formal tax law, statutes, and regulations. 261 Courts have repeatedly
cited and quoted Miller v. Commissioner, 262 in which the court stated
that “[t]he authoritative sources of Federal tax law are the statutes,
regulations, and judicial decisions; they do not include informal IRS
publications.” 263 The IRS takes the position that the Internal Revenue
Bulletin (“IRB”), a weekly government publication, is the IRS’s
authoritative instrument for announcing official IRS rulings and
procedures and for publishing Treasury Decisions and other items. 264
259. See, e.g., Link v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 460, 463–64 (1988), aff’d, 869 F.2d 1491 (6th Cir. 1989)
(denying graduate education expense deduction); Schneider v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 675
(1983) (denying MBA work-related education expense deduction); Sherman v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1191 (1977) (same); see also Allemeier v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (2005),
supplemented by 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 758 (2006) (allowing MBA work-related education expense
deductions).
260. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 256.
261. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 194–95 (2000); United States v. Josephberg, 562
F.3d 478, 498–500 (2d Cir. 2009); Carpenter v. United States, 495 F.2d 175, 184 (5th Cir. 1974);
Adler v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1964); Zimmerman v. Comm’r , 71 T.C. 367, 371 (1978),
aff’d, 614 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Comm’r, 620 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1980). But see
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913
(2020) (explaining that “[w]hen an agency changes course . . . it must be cognizant that
longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into
account.” (internal quotations omitted)).
262. 114 T.C. at 194–95.
263. Id. For cases citing Miller for the proposition that administrative guidance by the IRS is
not binding on the government, see, for example, Dorsey v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 907 (2006);
Dunnigan v. Comm’r, 110 T.C.M. (CCH) 320 (2015); and Blodgett v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH)
500 (2012).
264. I.R.S. Interim Guidance Mem. SBSE-04-0517-0030, IRM 4.10.7.2.4 (Jan. 10, 2018).
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The Agency has informed its employees internally that they must follow
any items published in the IRB and taxpayers may rely on them. 265
Despite the existence of this mechanism for transforming informal tax
guidance into internally binding rules, the IRS does not publish the vast
majority of its IRS publications, FAQs from its website, or statements
made by automated legal guidance in the IRB. 266
Additionally, if the IRS were to assert civil tax penalties against
the contractor for claiming the MBA expense deduction, the contractor
would encounter significant difficulties in attempting to show reliance
on IRS statements in informal tax guidance to defend against these
penalties. If the IRS, for example, were to assert an accuracy-related
tax penalty, such as disregard of rules and regulations, 267 the contractor
might attempt to defend against this penalty by claiming that he had a
“reasonable basis” for his position. 268 However, to assert this defense,
the contractor must demonstrate that he reasonably relied upon
written statements contained in an authority appearing on an exclusive
list of possibilities, including the Code, Regulations, Revenue Rulings,
judicial decisions, and items published by the IRS in the IRB. 269
Statements made by ITA, which are not published in the IRB, cannot
be used for a reasonable-basis defense. 270 Further, the contractor may
also be unsuccessful in presenting a “reasonable cause and good faith”
defense, which is provided by statute, because he would have difficulty
obtaining a complete written record of his communication with ITA to
show that his misunderstanding of the law was reasonable (unless he
had the foresight to take a screenshot of every stage of the questionand-answer session). 271
Even if the contractor had used third-party tax return
preparation software rather than ITA to determine whether he could
claim a deduction for the MBA tuition expenses, it is unlikely that he
could show his reliance on answers delivered by the software as a
defense against accuracy-related tax penalties. As discussed above,
third-party tax preparation products, such as Intuit’s TurboTax, often
republish statements from informal IRS guidance and mimic the
questions and answer that ITA provides. 272 As the Tax Court has
265. Id. (adding “Caution” statement to subsection of Internal Review Manual).
266. See Hickman, supra note 236, at 241; Leslie Book, Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat at the
Table, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 769 (2019).
267. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
268. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (1991).
269. Id. (“[P]osition [must be] reasonably based on one or more of the authorities set forth
in § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) . . . .”).
270. Id.
271. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
272. See supra notes 189–190 and accompanying text.
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commented when considering a taxpayer’s attempt to rely on tax
preparation software, this technology is “only as good as the
information one inputs into it.” 273 Consequently, the Tax Court and
many other courts have held that taxpayers who have relied on
TurboTax when completing their returns cannot use it as a tax penalty
defense. 274
If the contractor in this example had been able to consult with a
tax lawyer to access formal tax law, he may have received advice that
could have allowed him to defeat a challenge by the IRS. As a result of
the frequent litigation between the IRS and taxpayers over the
deductibility of MBA expenses, tax lawyers advertise that, in exchange
for a fee, they advise clients on how to structure their affairs before
claiming the deduction. 275 The Regulations contain ten specific,
illustrative examples of situations where taxpayers deducted workrelated education expenses, which are accompanied by analysis from
Treasury officials. 276 If the contractor had been able to afford to speak
with a tax lawyer, for example, the lawyer might have reviewed these
regulations and advised the contractor to engage in mass marketing
activities and to document these efforts before applying to any online
MBA programs. 277 The tax lawyer would also be familiar with the
relevant case law in order to help the contractor plan for his education
and prepare documentation in the event of an IRS audit. And if the
contractor could have paid for a written opinion from the tax lawyer, he
could also use that advice to support a “reasonable cause and good faith”
defense against accuracy-related tax penalties by showing he
reasonably relied on advice from a professional tax advisor. 278
On a much larger scale, wealthy individuals and business
taxpayers can access formal tax law to assist with tax planning in
situations in which the stakes are far higher than the contractor’s
deduction for work-related education expenses. In June 2021, for
example, the New York Times published an exposé of the private equity
273. Bunney v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 259, 267 (2000).
274. Id.; see, e.g., Bartlett v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 267 (2012); Bulakites v. Comm’r, 113
T.C.M. (CCH) 1384 (2017); see also Randy P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15
FL. TAX REV. 443 (2014).
275. See, e.g, MBA Student’s Attempt to Deduct Tuition Fails in the Tax Court, BERGER L.,
https://www.bergerlaw.net/mba-students-attempt-to-deduct-tuition-fails-in-the-tax-court.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/N9GG-L4F8]; MBA Students, VIRTUAL TAX PRO.,
http://thevirtualtaxprofessional.com/mbastudents.php
(last
visited
Mar.
7,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/4GB7-AYGY].
276. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) to (3) (as amended in 1967).
277. See, e.g., Allemeier v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (2005), supplemented by 91 T.C.M.
(CCH) 758 (2006) (allowing MBA work-related education expense deductions).
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003).

1136

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4:1093

industry’s efforts to use “fee waivers” to convert their two percent
management fee from ordinary income, taxed at a top ordinary income
tax rate of thirty-seven percent, to income taxed at a net capital gain
rate of twenty percent. 279 The private equity industry had already used
a tax planning gambit called “carried interest” to ensure that the bulk
of private equity fund managers’ fees were taxed at the lower capital
gain rate. 280 Despite already having this tax victory, the private equity
industry wanted to get more of fund managers’ fees eligible for this
lower rate of taxation. 281 In order to do so, sophisticated advisors
working for the private equity firms relied on a deeply ambiguous and
complicated set of tax rules regarding the receipt and taxation of
partnership profits interest. 282 The advisors had to rely on a number of
different partnership Code sections, legislative history underlying such
sections, case law, and more. 283 The combination of the complexity and
ambiguity of these provisions made the aggressive planning possible. 284
The ambiguity, combined with the fact that the planning occurred
based on the advice of counsel, also offered the private equity firms the
ability to take advantage of the “reasonable cause and good faith”
defense against civil tax penalties. 285
The above examples illustrate how informal tax law offers
taxpayers a “heads–the IRS wins, tails–the taxpayer loses” scenario.
While informal tax law can play a critical and uncontroversial function
in unambiguous situations, when the tax law is ambiguous, informal
tax law has significant deficits relative to formal law. Informal tax law
can practically bind taxpayers to disadvantageous outcomes on the one
hand, but also fails to provide taxpayers certainty or penalty protection
when it offers advantageous outcomes on the other. Informal tax law
279. Jesse Drucker & Danny Hakim, Private Inequity: How a Powerful Industry Conquered
the Tax System, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/12/business/private-equitytaxes.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CD3H-RZHX].
280. See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008) (describing in detail).
281. Drucker & Hakim, supra note 279.
282. See generally Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, TAX NOTES,
Feb. 9, 2009, at 743 (describing in detail).
283. Id.
284. For instance, a central issue was whether receiving an additional carried interest in
investment partnerships, instead of a management fee waiver, constituted receipt of a profits
interest. The taxation of profits interests is notoriously complex and ambiguous, and has spawned
regulations, proposed regulations, anti-abuse Code sections, legislative history, Revenue Rulings,
case law, and more. See, e.g., Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for
Services, 47 TAX L. REV. 247 (1991) (describing some of this context).
285. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003); see also Emily Cauble,
Accessible Reliable Tax Advice, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 589, 591 (2017) (discussing how expert
opinions may be used to provide protection against IRS penalties); Field, supra note 218
(discussing use of tax opinions).

2022]

THE INEQUITY OF INFORMAL GUIDANCE

1137

also offers taxpayers far fewer opportunities to engage in the type of
sophisticated planning available to private equity fund managers and
the many other taxpayers who have access to the formal tax law
through sophisticated advisors.
Making matters worse, because of the complex way the formal
tax law is written, as well as restrictions on what professionals can use
formal tax law to make legal interpretations, tax lawyers have
significant advantages in terms of access to formal tax law. The high
cost of tax lawyers as well as other sophisticated advisors means, for all
intents and purposes, that the formal tax law is available only to
taxpayers with significant resources. The result is exactly what we
should fear from an access to justice perspective: the combination of the
two-tier system of legal drafting and inequitable access to resources in
society means that different taxpayers not only have access to different
types and amounts of counsel, as we would have expected; they also
have access to fundamentally different forms of law.
The way in which two-tiered legal drafting systematically
advantages certain groups and systematically disadvantages others
should sound familiar. As we explored, scholars have shown that in
many areas of the law, the substance and enforcement of the law
systematically advantages certain groups and systematically
disadvantages others along racial and other class-based lines. 286
While the lack of attention to two-tiered legal drafting until now
limits our ability to conclude with certainty which groups are
advantaged and which are disadvantaged, it is likely that access to the
formal tax law has distributive consequences since access to
sophisticated advisors likely tracks income and wealth. 287 It is an open,
and pressing, question whether two-tiered legal drafting also
disproportionately advantages and disadvantages taxpayers based on
other characteristics. 288 Of particular note in this regard, the IRS does
not request any information about taxpayers’ race on federal income tax
returns or report information on the race of individual taxpayers it has
audited, 289 let alone information about the racial composition of visitors

286. See supra Part I.A.
287. See supra notes 213–214 and accompanying text.
288. For illustrations of analysis in other areas, see supra notes 35–51 and accompanying text.
289. See Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of Colorblind
Tax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1 (2019); Dorothy Brown, Race and Tax: Colorblind No More, JOTWELL
(Feb. 25, 2021), https://tax.jotwell.com/race-and-tax-colorblind-no-more/ [https://perma.cc/ZSY2LU2M]; Brian Faler, Taxes May Not Be Colorblind, and Critics Say More Data Could Prove It,
POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2021, 4:22 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/16/race-taxes-irs476371 [https://perma.cc/ED9N-42Q2]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan.
20, 2021) (establishing equitable data working group).
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to the IRS website. 290 Yet in other areas of the law where unequal
enforcement is known, government officials and scholars have access to
data regarding the race and age of affected individuals. 291 Given the
distinctions between formal tax law and informal tax law that this Part
has illustrated, the lack of available information about the personal
characteristics of the taxpayers who primarily consult and rely upon
the informal tax law raises significant equity concerns.
E. Beyond Tax Law
Other federal agencies, in addition to the IRS, also issue
extensive informal guidance to assist individuals and businesses and to
influence their behavior. As one scholar recently noted, such informal
administrative guidance has become “the bread and butter of agency
practice.” 292 Myriad examples of informal law can be found in the
context of actions of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act; 293 the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services’ guidance regarding drug
pricing; 294 the Federal Communication Commission’s distribution of
guidance through its “General Counsel’s Blog”; 295 the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s description of hazardous waste; 296
and the U.S. Department of Education’s guidance regarding
290. Exceptions to this statement are situations where a statutory or administrative rule
affects a specific group of taxpayers, where information about these taxpayers’ race is collected by
nontax agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See Inmate Race, FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last updated Feb. 26,
2022) [https://perma.cc/AJT9-4HDK]. In addressing the IRS’s initial decision to withhold economic
impact payments from incarcerated individuals in 2020, Professor Leslie Book has argued that
this type of policy “can reinforce race-based power disparities and perpetuate racial injustice.” See
Book, supra note 170, at 672.
291. See supra Part I.A.
292. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study
of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 165, 168 (2019).
293. See Mark DeLoach, Can’t We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with
Others” as a Major Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313,
1321 (2004) (“Since Congress did not define many of the key terms in the ADA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has provided guidance through both formal
regulations and informal guidelines.” (footnotes omitted)).
294. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1814 (2015).
295. Thomas M. Johnson Jr. & Michael Carlson, Caveat Lector: A Blog Post About Reliance on
Agency Blog Posts, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N: BLOG (Apr. 4, 2019, 12:30 PM),
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2019/04/04/caveat-lector-blog-post-about-reliance-agencyblog-posts [https://perma.cc/QRZ7-AD69].
296. See RCRA Online, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://rcrapublic.epa.gov/rcraonline/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2022) [https://perma.cc/7TDG-QS6D]. Inputting “hazardous waste” in the search
bar yields 3,157 results in the form of Agency questions and answers, letters, memoranda, and
publications.
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transgender discrimination; 297 among many others. 298 Many of these
examples show that even though the agency has issued explanations
and positions that appear to be definitive, individuals and businesses
cannot use this type of informal law to bind the agency or avoid the
enforcement actions by the agency, including monetary penalties and
other sanctions.
In response to federal agencies’ growing use of informal
administrative guidance, government officials and policymakers have
attempted to institute reform measures. For example, in 2019,
President Trump signed an executive order prohibiting federal agencies
from creating binding rules through the issuance of guidance
documents. 299 (President Biden subsequently revoked this executive
order on his first day in office. 300) At the agency level, in 2020, the U.S.
Department of Justice added a rule to its internal manual that states
that lawyers cannot rely on guidance documents in any civil or criminal
cases. 301 Other agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration,
have implemented “good guidance practices,” in which the agency
commits to seek public input before issuing guidance and to seek
suggestions for guidance projects from stakeholders. 302 Congress has
also attempted to address administrative guidance issued by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services by requiring the Agency to
afford the public notice and a chance to comment before the Agency
establishes or changes a “substantive legal standard” affecting
Medicare benefits. 303
While each of these reform measures is designed to increase the
efficiency, fairness, and transparency of agencies’ issuance of
administrative guidance, they do not address the access to justice gap
between those who can rely on formal law through sophisticated
advisors and those who have no other option than to consult informal
law. Policy reforms that are designed to limit the use of informal
297. See Blake Emerson, The Claims of Official Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social
Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122, 2125 (2019).
298. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 294 (discussing informal lawmaking in various contexts);
Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 501 (2015) (examining how “perceived congressional incapacitation” has led to
“administrative improvisation”).
299. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9, 2019).
300. Exec. Order No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,049 (Jan. 20, 2021).
301. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 1-19.000 (2018).
302. Fact Sheet: FDA Good Guidance Practices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/transparency-initiative/fact-sheet-fda-good-guidance-practices
(last updated Dec. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NZ9U-FDB8].
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2); see also Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019)
(holding that Department of Health and Human Services was required to comply with notice-andcomment rulemaking under Medicare Act before changing payment formula).
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administrative guidance, such as President Trump’s 2019 executive
order, 304 would exacerbate the access to justice gap, given how unlikely
it is that middle- and low-income individuals and small businesses
would be able to understand the formal law in the absence of this
guidance. Further, policies that focus on the government’s use of
informal administrative guidance to support enforcement and
litigation, such as the U.S. Department of Justice’s guidance policy, 305
do not relieve concerns by individuals who rely on this guidance that
the government may take contrary enforcement actions in the future.
Good guidance practices aimed at involving the public in formulation of
informal administrative guidance do not address the inaccessibility of
formal law, such as complex statutory text that can only be interpreted
and applied with aid of a lawyer. 306 Finally, these policy responses do
not offer new legal defenses to penalties and other sanctions for
individuals and businesses that take actions in reasonable reliance on
statements contained in informal administrative guidance.
III. CAN TWO-TIERED LEGAL DRAFTING BE REFORMED?
What steps, if any, can legislators and government officials take
to address the growing gap between formal and informal law? Should
policymakers focus reform efforts on one type of law (formal or informal)
or the other? And is reform of the formal law itself the only possibility
for addressing the imbalance between formal and informal tax law?
As this Part shows, there is unlikely to be a single,
comprehensive approach that can alleviate the disadvantages faced by
taxpayers who lack access to the formal law through sophisticated
advisors. Instead, this Part presents a menu of possibilities for studying
two-tiered legal drafting and addressing the inequities it causes.
A. Reform of Formal Law
Simplicity has long been described as one of the essential
objectives of tax reform, along with fairness and efficiency. 307 Yet this
objective has also been depicted as the holy grail of tax law, an ideal

304. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9, 2019).
305. U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 301.
306. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 302.
307. For discussion, see Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1267; and Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319 (1994).
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that legislators often seek, but cannot ever seem to find. 308 As we
propose below, however, statutory simplification that is targeted to help
taxpayers who lack access to sophisticated tax lawyers and accountants
may gain more traction with legislators and the public.
As an initial step, legislators and other policymakers should
consider the sources of simplexity, which pervades IRS publications,
FAQs, and automated legal guidance. 309 Simplexity occurs when the
IRS presents contested tax law as clear tax rules, adds administrative
gloss to the formal tax law, and fails to fully explain the tax law. 310 One
source of simplexity is the enactment of statutes and regulations that
rely on judicially created standards, such as the test for whether an
item is an ordinary and necessary business expense. 311 The facts-andcircumstances nature of this type of standard creates the need for the
IRS to describe this type of formal law by adding its own examples and
even terminology in its description of the standard in informal
guidance. 312 Another source of simplexity is the use of statutory
standards that focus on the taxpayer’s intent or purpose. These
statutes, such as the statute governing hobby losses, often lead to
judicial decisions and regulatory examples. 313 The IRS, then, attempts
to summarize the authorities that interpret these statutes in its
informal tax guidance, which sometimes results in simplifications that
deviate from the underlying tax law. 314 Last, vague statutory terms
may require the Treasury to offer detailed regulations to define the
terms, but this text may not always carry over precisely to the IRS’s
informal guidance documents. 315
To reduce the potential for gaps between the formal and
informal tax law, one drafting approach could be, where feasible, to
adopt clear rules rather than standards when statutes address issues
that disproportionately affect taxpayers who lack access to
sophisticated advisors. 316 For example, rather than focusing on
308. McCaffery, supra note 307; see also Wright, supra note 54, at 715 (discussing complexity
in the law); Steve R. Johnson, The Future of American Tax Administration: Conceptual
Alternatives and Political Realities, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 5 (2016) (same).
309. For discussion, see Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28; and Blank & Osofsky,
Automated, supra note 28.
310. Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 189.
311. See I.R.C. § 162(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
312. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 219–20 (exploring in the context of
IRS publications).
313. See I.R.C. § 183(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972).
314. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 238–40.
315. See id. at 226–33 (discussing administrative gloss in IRS publications).
316. For discussion of rules and standards, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992); and Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and
the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 363–68 (2005) (in tax law).
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subjective factors like intent or purpose, Congress could use clear rules
to define how specific taxpayers and activities are classified. Such
provisions might include bright-line thresholds involving factors such
as amounts of compensation or number of hours or days worked. 317
Rule-based statutes could clarify formal tax law that affects average
individual taxpayers and small businesses on a regular basis, such as
laws regarding when an activity constitutes a trade or business rather
than a hobby, 318 when work-related education constitutes an ordinary
and necessary business expense, 319 and when an individual is an
employee rather than an independent contractor. 320
Rule-based statutory drafting offers several benefits as an
approach for addressing the inequities of two-tiered legal drafting.
First, by clearly defining statutory terms with bright-line rules,
Congress may limit the issues that could become the subject of
conflicting judicial decisions, which average taxpayers would then only
be able to access with the assistance of sophisticated advisors. Second,
if Congress uses bright-line rules, such as dollar or time thresholds, the
IRS may need to issue less informal guidance compared to situations
where Congress enacts statutes that include purpose-based tests and
standards. And when Congress uses a bright-line rule, the IRS is less
likely to deviate from the statutory text in its informal guidance.
Despite these benefits, rule-based statutory drafting is not
always possible or appropriate. If, for instance, Congress enacts a
statute with a clear rule, but does not adequately address different
scenarios, greater complexity in the tax system can result. The
Treasury may be required to issue rules that address these omissions
in regulations, which, in turn, can lead to simplexity as the IRS
attempts to explain both the statute and regulations to the public.
Bright-line rule-based drafting can also lead to problematic
discontinuities in tax treatment when high tax liability stakes turn on
small differences. 321 And without sufficient tax penalties or anti-abuse
provisions, taxpayers may attempt to exploit bright-line rules to claim
tax benefits that Congress did not intend. 322 However, in some cases,
317. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (days-based substantial presence test).
318. See I.R.C. § 162(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
319. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2), (3) (as amended in 1967).
320. See I.R.C. § 3401(c) (defining employee). For discussion, see Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring,
Tax Law’s Workplace Shift, 100 B.U. L. REV. 651, 666 (2020); and David Bauer, The
Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138 (2015).
321. Joel Slemrod, Buenas Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System Design, 11 EJOURNAL
TAX RSCH. 259 (2013).
322. For discussion, see Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory
Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 766; and Jeremy
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Congress has used bright-line rules to resolve legal ambiguity
effectively, such as clear rules involving issues such as the tax
treatment of gifts from employers to employees (default rule of income
classification), 323 participation in a real property trade or business
(hours-based threshold), 324 and U.S. residency status (days-based
threshold). 325
Another possibility for addressing problems caused by twotiered legal drafting is to formalize the statutory drafting of the Code,
especially where low-income taxpayers are concerned. 326 Tax legislation
often features ambiguity and omissions as a result of errors resulting
from cross-references and other drafting defects. 327 For instance, in
2020, the IRS attempted to address statutory ambiguities and
omissions in the CARES Act in its FAQs regarding the first round of
economic impact payments by providing guidance on topics such as
whether a taxpayer must return a payment received on behalf of
deceased taxpayers or children who, after payment, turned
seventeen. 328 Professor Sarah Lawsky has argued that one response to
the frequent occurrence of drafting errors is for legislative staffs to
formalize statutory language prior to enactment by translating it into
logical terms. 329 As Lawsky argues, this approach could “help drafters
avoid unintentional ambiguity and refine the language used in the
statute.” 330 She illustrates how formalization could be implemented to
redraft statutes governing the home mortgage deduction, among other
items. 331
Formalization could allow legislators to draft statutory text that
would be more comprehensible to computers. Statutes that adopt a
formalized approach could be especially helpful when the rules involve
delivery of benefits to low-income individuals. The earned income tax
Scott, Check the Box for Tax Avoidance, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:42 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/02/19/check-the-box-for-taxavoidance/?sh=5cbc446f756a [https://perma.cc/7FUL-SMTB] (discussing abusive tax planning and
check-the-box regulations).
323. I.R.C. § 102(c)(1).
324. I.R.C. § 469(c)(7)(B) (750-hour service requirement for real estate professionals).
325. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (days-based substantial presence test).
326. For discussion of formalization, see Lawsky, supra note 116; Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic
for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60 (2017); and Stephanie Hoffer, What If Tax Law’s Future Is Now?,
16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 67 (2020).
327. For discussion, see Lawsky, supra note 116; Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 811 (2016); and Anuj C. Desai, The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation, 77
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177 (2020).
328. See supra notes 227–235 and accompanying text.
329. See Lawsky, supra note 116.
330. Id. at 379.
331. See id. at 382–87.
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credit (“EITC”), for instance, is often described as one of the most
complex statutes in the Code. 332 One source of the complexity arises
from the difficulty that taxpayers face in calculating the amount of the
benefits for which they are eligible. 333 Professor Jacob Goldin notes that
for these types of issues, Lawsky’s formalization proposal could be used
to draft a statute that better identifies the information required for
EITC eligibility. 334 By adopting formalization of statutory text where
provisions feature extensive computation, Congress could reduce the
potential for the IRS’s automated tools to reach wrong results or for the
IRS to issue informal guidance that adds administrative gloss to
statutory text. Congress could consider formalization as a way to reform
statutes in addition to the EITC, such as the child tax credit 335 and the
childcare credit, 336 each of which targets low-income taxpayers.
One objection to formalization of statutes providing benefit
programs targeted at low-income taxpayers is that it would make the
law appear more complex and incomprehensible to average
taxpayers. 337 But if Congress can draft statutes using terms that are
more understandable to computers than humans, then the IRS can offer
taxpayers automated legal guidance tools that apply this law accurately
and efficiently. As Goldin has argued, even though the EITC features
significant amounts of “computational complexity,” taxpayers can
access the benefits provided by this statute with the help of “assisted
preparation methods,” such as software provided through the IRS’s
Free File program, a partnership between the IRS and private software
companies. 338 While formalized statutes involving computation may
require taxpayers to rely more on computers, they are less likely to
result in conflicting formal and informal tax law than statutes that
feature purpose-based standards and requirements. 339 These types of
statutes would also be less likely to force taxpayers to seek help from
sophisticated advisors, such as tax lawyers, or to disproportionately
advantage those taxpayers who do.
332. See, e.g., Robert Greenstein, John Wancheck & Chuck Marr, Reducing Overpayments in
the Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 3–4,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/reducing-overpayments-in-the-earned-income-taxcredit (last updated Jan. 31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FHS7-7A6E] (“The EITC is one of the most
complex elements of the tax code that individual taxpayers face.”).
333. See id.
334. Goldin, supra note 199, at 71 n.81.
335. I.R.C. § 24.
336. I.R.C. § 21.
337. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 207, at 94–95 (criticizing the “unprecedented computational
complexity” of modern tax law).
338. See Goldin, supra note 199.
339. See supra notes 309–314 and accompanying text.
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Congress should not attempt to address the inequities of twotiered legal drafting by focusing primarily on cosmetic aspects of the
formal tax law in an effort to make the Code more readable.
Characteristics such as the numbers of words or income tax brackets
are frequent political targets of proponents of tax simplification. 340
Compared to reforms such as greater use of rule-based statutes or
formalizing statutory texts, the introduction of short, readable phrases
in statutory text may not assist taxpayers who lack access to
sophisticated advisors who can access the formal tax law.
B. Reform of Informal Law
Bright lines and formalization will not be appropriate in all
situations, especially where legislators opt to enact a statute that
addresses the principal purpose for a transaction in order to combat a
potentially abusive tax position. 341 There will also be times when
Congress passes legislation quickly, such as in times of economic crisis,
and the IRS will be the only agency that can address unanswered
questions in informal guidance. 342 And as a result of technological
advancements and limited funding for in-person assistance, the IRS
will likely continue to engage in automation of guidance through its
website. 343 As this Part argues, changes to informal law are needed as
well.
Notice of Unsettled Formal Law. The IRS often attempts to
describe the law in seemingly unambiguous terms in its informal
guidance, such as when it describes the definition of “ordinary” business
expenses in IRS Publication 535, Business Expenses, using only one
judicial interpretation and without discussion of conflicting
340. See, e.g., Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Ted Cruz’s Claim That the IRS Tax Code Has More Words
Than the Bible, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2015/03/11/ted-cruzs-claim-that-the-irs-tax-code-has-more-words-than-the-bible/
[https://perma.cc/8ZWY-B6SY]; Press Release, The White House, President Bush Provides
Leadership
on
Tax
Reform
(Sept.
2,
2004),
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-7.html [https://perma.cc/QC5C-GNMU]
(“The Internal Revenue Code contains more than a million words.”); Scott Greenberg, Federal Tax
Laws and Regulations Are Now Over 10 Million Words Long, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://taxfoundation.org/federal-tax-laws-and-regulations-are-now-over-10-million-words-long/
[https://perma.cc/CN37-XTBU]. For further discussion, see Emily Cauble, Superficial Proxies for
Simplicity in Tax Law, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 329 (2019).
341. For discussion, see Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income
Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485 (1967); and McCormack, supra note 322.
342. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
343. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NO. 201540-032, INTERIM RESULTS OF THE 2015 FILING SEASON 14 (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201540032fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/F93BCB4R].
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decisions. 344 In contrast, in the formal tax law, the IRS often includes
notices of conflicting judicial decisions. For example, in Revenue Ruling
2010-25, the IRS ruled that a hypothetical taxpayer who incurred a
mortgage liability to acquire a qualified residence could treat the
mortgage as home equity indebtedness to the extent it exceeded $1
million, up to an excess of $100,000. 345 When issuing the ruling, the IRS
stated that it disagreed with several conflicting Tax Court holdings. 346
The IRS’s approach to providing notice in the formal tax law to
alert taxpayers of conflicting authorities should be incorporated in
informal IRS guidance as well. In its informal guidance, including IRS
publications, FAQs, and automated legal guidance, the IRS should
include warnings when the formal law underlying its description is
either unsettled or is in conflict with the description. In order to provide
taxpayers with an opportunity to make a decision about which tax
position to claim, the IRS could present the government-favorable
position in its informal guidance and a notice that there are alternative
interpretations that the IRS has not adopted. The benefit of this change
is that taxpayers who must rely on informal guidance could make a tax
planning decision appropriate to their own risk tolerance. Where they
can afford it and the issue matters to them, taxpayers might consult
with a lawyer or accountant or at least attempt to research the issue
further.
One potential criticism of this approach is that including notice
of unsettled or conflicting law in informal IRS guidance could reduce
the simplicity and usability of the guidance to average taxpayers.
However, especially in the case of automated legal guidance, FAQs, and
other online tools—resources that lack warnings regarding conflicting
law—such notice could be integrated through brief statements followed
by hyperlinks to authorities. The IRS has demonstrated that it can
include such authorities using this approach in situations where it has
been subject to an injunction, such as when it included a reference to
Scholl v. Mnuchin 347 in its FAQ regarding economic impact payments
to incarcerated individuals. 348
Explanation of Changes. Another important reform that the IRS
could adopt would be to provide notice to taxpayers when it makes
344. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N 535, CATALOG NO.
15065Z, BUSINESS EXPENSES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p535.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F93B-CB4R].
345. Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571–72.
346. Id.
347. 494 F. Supp. 3d 661 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
348. Q A5 under Questions and Answers about the First Economic Impact Payment, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/questions-and-answers-about-the-first-economicimpact-payment-topic-a-eligibility (last updated Mar. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/AZD6-J7Q8].
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changes to the content of informal tax guidance. In 2020, the IRS
frequently made changes to online FAQs regarding COVID-19-related
legislation. 349 Taxpayers and tax practitioners criticized the IRS for
making changes without highlighting them or describing the reasoning
behind them. 350 Similarly, the IRS makes changes to questions and
answers in its automated legal guidance tools, such as ITA, without
identifying the changes for taxpayers. 351 In addition, the IRS does not
maintain an online archive of previously issued responses from ITA and
descriptions of the law that have appeared on its website. 352 In the
interest of fairness and government transparency, the IRS should
provide taxpayers with notice of changes that it makes to its informal
guidance, offer taxpayers an explanation of the changes, and create a
searchable database that taxpayers can use to research previous IRS
statements.
Effective Dates. Finally, the IRS should include effective dates
on all of its informal guidance, including its online resources. Even
though the IRS includes effective dates on the cover of its printed
informal guidance, such as IRS publications, 353 it does not include
effective dates on resources such as ITA or descriptions of the formal
tax law on its website. 354 While the IRS announced in October 2021 that
it would begin including dates on “Fact Sheets” involving “significant
FAQs,” this policy is limited to only certain FAQs and does not extend
to any other informal IRS guidance. 355 This approach is markedly
different from the way in which the formal tax law is drafted, where
provisions of the Code, Regulations, and Revenue Rulings all contain
effective dates. 356 Effective dates are valuable because they alert
taxpayers whether they are reading the most up-to-date IRS informal
guidance. Further, if the IRS becomes bound by any of its informal
guidance, a possibility discussed next, then the effective dates are
critical information.
349. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text; 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note
169, at 36–38.
350. See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 169, at 36 (encouraging the IRS to adopt more
transparent policies); Thomas, supra note 233 (discussing “the (lack of a) legal rationale for the
[IRS’s] conclusion[s]”).
351. See Blank & Osofsky, Automated, supra note 28, at 186, 239–43.
352. See id. at 236–38; 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 169, at 36.
353. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 163 (described as “For use in preparing
2021 Returns”).
354. See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV, supra note 169, at 36–38.
355. See infra notes 380–386. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the IRS
frequently updated posted FAQs, taxpayers complained that they could not determine whether
they were reading the most up-to-date version or whether the version applied to dates at issue in
their specific situation. See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 169, at 36–38.
356. See, e.g., IRM 32.1.1.2.5 (Aug. 2, 2018) (describing effective dates of Treasury Decisions).
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C. Taxpayer Reliance on Informal Law
Equal access to justice demands equal ability to rely on formal
and informal tax law. Taxpayer reliance involves two separate
questions: first, whether taxpayers can use the IRS’s statements in
administrative guidance to prevent the Agency from applying a
contrary rule or interpretation of the law against the taxpayer; and
second, whether the taxpayer can offer the IRS’s statements in
administrative guidance as defenses against civil tax penalties. In this
Part, we argue that when policymakers address these two questions,
they should adopt reforms that consider differences between unilateral
administrative guidance, where the IRS uses language that is fixed and
intended for all taxpayers, and bilateral administrative guidance,
where the IRS tailors its statements to individual taxpayers based on
information they input, such as automated legal guidance tools.
1. Binding Informal Law
As we have discussed, unlike formal tax law, such as the Code
and Regulations, informal administrative guidance does not bind the
IRS. If the IRS makes a statement in informal administrative guidance
but later applies a different interpretation of the law, an affected
taxpayer cannot point to the administrative guidance to estop the
IRS. 357 For instance, even though the IRS has issued FAQs addressing
the calculation of tax basis in cryptocurrency that does not appear in
the formal tax law, 358 the Agency is not restricted from deviating from
these FAQs in the future, even when reviewing the tax returns of
taxpayers who relied up on them. As a general matter, unless the IRS
publishes administrative guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, it
does not commit to be internally bound by any statements it makes in
its informal tax guidance. 359
357. See supra notes 262–266 and accompanying text.
358. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 252; see Letter from Christopher W. Hesse, Chair,
AICPA Tax Exec. Comm., to Charles P. Rettig, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., and Michael J.
(Feb.
28,
2020),
Desmond,
Chief
Couns.,
Internal
Revenue
Serv.
16
https://us.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/tax/downloadabledocuments/20200228-aicpaletter-on-irs-virtual-currency-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NRU-D8H3] (“FAQ 40 suggests a
method that is not allowed under the Code.”).
359. See I.R.S. Interim Guidance Mem. SBSE-04-0517-0030, IRM 4.10.7.2.4 (Jan. 10, 2018).
Courts have addressed IRS simplifications as well. See, e.g., Adler v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 91, 93 (9th
Cir. 1964); Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 195 (2000) (“Administrative guidance contained in IRS
publications is not binding on the Government . . . .”); Zimmerman v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 367,
371 (1978) (“[A]uthoritative sources of Federal tax law are . . . not in . . . informal [IRS]
publications.”). Other courts have held that “IRS publications, though ‘aimed at explaining
existing tax law to taxpayers,’ do not have the force of law.” United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d
478, 498 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 264, 266 (2003)).
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There are several arguments in favor of allowing the IRS to issue
nonbinding administrative guidance. Even though most IRS informal
administrative guidance is not legally binding on the Agency under
current law, it nonetheless enhances government transparency by
revealing to taxpayers the Agency officials’ interpretation of or
administrative position regarding the formal tax law. 360 Moreover, if
IRS employees were required to apply the formal tax law in a manner
consistent with all statements in its administrative guidance, the
leadership of the IRS may respond by issuing less of this guidance,
harming taxpayers who are most in need of plain language explanations
of the formal tax law. 361
Yet there are compelling reasons to change the status quo
regarding taxpayer reliance on informal IRS guidance. As a matter of
procedural fairness, taxpayers should be able to rely on statements
from the IRS if they are not in conflict with the formal tax law. In most
cases where taxpayers have concerns about relying on the IRS
statements in administrative guidance, the formal tax law is ambiguous
or silent on the tax issue at stake. 362 For example, a significant amount
of the IRS’s FAQs address situations where there is no underlying
formal tax law, on topics such as rules for determining basis in
cryptocurrency and the eligibility for the child tax credit in certain
situations. 363 Further, if IRS officials were bound by the Agency’s own
statements in administrative guidance, IRS officials may simply
exercise greater caution when making statements rather than reduce
their issuance of guidance. This approach could result in statements
that are more consistent with the formal tax law and less likely to result
in IRS contradictions during subsequent audits of taxpayers.
There is a strong case for allowing taxpayers to rely on all
unilateral IRS guidance—where the IRS publishes statements to all
taxpayers using language that does not require inputs or responses
from taxpayers. Administrative guidance such as IRS publications,
online FAQs, and statements on the IRS website would fall into this
category. In these cases, the Agency is the only actor speaking and it
can determine the content of its communication. Especially where there
is no underlying formal law that addresses the issue, as a matter of
fairness, the IRS should commit to allow taxpayers to rely on its
statements in unilateral administrative guidance without risk of future
360. See Blank & Osofsky, Simplexity, supra note 28, at 194, 203.
361. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 1239, 1249 (2017) (explaining that external abilities to monitor internal administrative
law may lead to less of it).
362. See supra notes 251–253 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 251–253 and accompanying text.
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contradiction by IRS officials. This approach, which has been advocated
by the National Taxpayer Advocate and other scholars in the case of
FAQs, 364 should be adopted for all IRS unilateral administrative
guidance. This change would support procedural fairness, create more
equal reliance opportunities for taxpayers with different economic
resources, and, potentially, enhance the perceived legitimacy of the
IRS. 365
In contrast, we propose that the IRS should not be bound by
advice that the Agency delivers through bilateral administrative
guidance—that which requires taxpayers to input information
regarding their own circumstances in exchange for the output of advice
from the IRS. First, the quality of the answers that the IRS’s automated
legal guidance such as ITA delivers is only as good as the taxpayer’s
inputs. 366 As tools such as ITA do not ask the taxpayer follow-up
questions, they may generate incorrect answers because of limited
information supplied by taxpayers. Second, the advice that automated
legal guidance tools may provide varies among taxpayers, depending on
the extent to which taxpayers input requested information
accurately. 367 Allowing taxpayers to use statements from automated
legal guidance to bind the IRS could result in unequal treatment of
taxpayers with similar circumstances. Third, compared to unilateral
IRS guidance, bilateral IRS guidance is subject to taxpayer abuse. For
example, taxpayers could input information regarding a purchase of
equipment into ITA but ignore the legal requirement that the
equipment be related to medical care to generate an answer from ITA
that the equipment is tax deductible. 368 For these reasons, taxpayers
should not be permitted to use IRS statements made in bilateral
364. See TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE: FISCAL YEAR 2022 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 29–30 (June 2021),
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/JRC22_FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZFU7-RNQP]; 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 169, at 36, 45, 67–68.
365. See, e.g., Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An
Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 259
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic
Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 408 (1998). We do not take a position on
whether, or the extent to which, the internally binding nature of guidance would affect the IRS’s
procedural obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Metzger & Stack, supra note
361, at 1279–81 (discussing ambiguity). We do note that the IRS already binds itself to certain
types of guidance (such as Revenue Rulings), which it claims do not require notice and comment
procedures, since it is subregulatory. David J. Kautter & Brent J. McIntosh, Policy Statement on
the Tax Regulatory Process, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 2–3 (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Policy-Statement-on-the-Tax-Regulatory-Process.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VNC5-CNDR]. Our claim here is a substantive one.
366. Blank & Osofsky, Automated, supra note 28, at 217, 237.
367. Id. at 207–12.
368. Id. at 210–11.
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administrative guidance to estop the agency from taking a contrary
position.
2. Tax Penalty Defenses
In addition, policymakers should allow taxpayers to rely upon
statements in IRS guidance to defend against civil tax penalties. As a
result of the “reasonableness” requirement of many existing civil tax
penalty defenses, 369 we argue that taxpayers should be permitted to
assert these defenses by showing they reasonably relied upon
statements in either unilateral or bilateral IRS administrative
guidance.
Under current law, taxpayers who have legal counsel have
greater opportunities to defend against accuracy-related tax penalties
than taxpayers who only have access to IRS administrative guidance
and third-party tax-preparation software. If the IRS asserts an
accuracy-related tax penalty against a taxpayer, that taxpayer may
defend against this tax penalty by showing that the taxpayer acted with
“reasonable cause and good faith.” 370 Taxpayers may satisfy this
requirement by presenting the IRS with a written tax opinion from legal
counsel upon which they relied. 371 Conversely, taxpayers who have only
relied upon informal IRS guidance, including automated legal guidance,
may face difficulty in successfully asserting the reasonable cause and
good faith defense. 372 Additionally, taxpayers who attempt to assert a
“reasonable basis” defense against any of the accuracy-related tax
penalties must show that they reasonably relied upon a specific formal
tax law source, such as the Code, Regulations, Revenue Rulings,
judicial decisions, and announcements published by the IRS in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin. 373 If the IRS has not published its
administrative guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, taxpayers
may not use it to present a reasonable basis defense. 374
To equalize access to the tax penalty defenses, policymakers
should allow taxpayers to show reasonable reliance upon unilateral IRS
administrative guidance, such as IRS publications that the IRS issued
to all taxpayers. The IRS would retain control over the content of its

369. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (“reasonable cause”); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended
in 2003) (must be “reasonably based on one or more of the authorities set forth in § 1.66624(d)(3)(iii)”).
370. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003).
371. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003).
372. Blank & Osofsky, Automated, supra note 28, at 234.
373. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003).
374. Id.
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administrative guidance and a new penalty regime could encourage its
officials to exercise greater adherence to the formal tax law when
issuing this guidance. Expansion of the penalty defense should not
permit taxpayers to apply contorted readings of the IRS’s statements to
defend against tax penalties because they would still be required to
show they acted reasonably. 375
This treatment should be extended to statements in bilateral
IRS administrative guidance as well. While we have argued that
taxpayers should not be able to bind the IRS to its statements made
through automated legal guidance, 376 there are fewer opportunities for
taxpayer manipulation and abuse using such statements to support tax
penalty defenses. First, taxpayers who attempt to rely on statements
from sources like ITA and other interactive online tools would still be
required to show that they reasonably relied on them when claiming
tax positions. 377 This requirement would still allow the IRS and courts
to reject a claimed penalty defense where the taxpayer submitted false
or misleading inputs designed to yield a desired answer simply for
penalty defense purposes. 378 Second, in some cases, to assert a
reasonable basis defense, such as when the IRS asserts the accuracyrelated tax penalty for disregard of rules and regulations, taxpayers
must disclose their reliance on a specific source to the IRS when filing
their tax return. 379 The advance disclosure requirement would deter
abusive use of bilateral IRS administrative guidance for penalty
defense purposes and could even be expanded to apply to other tax
penalties.
In October 2021, the IRS announced an update to its process of
releasing FAQs on newly enacted tax legislation. 380 According to the
IRS press release, starting on the date of the announcement, the IRS
will announce “significant FAQs on newly enacted tax legislation” and
potentially other “emerging issues” and any “updates or revisions to
these FAQs” in news releases posted on the IRS website and in a
separate “Fact Sheet.” 381 Each of these Fact Sheets, according to the
IRS, will now be dated and prior versions will be maintained in an
archive on the IRS website. 382 Most importantly, the IRS announced
375. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2003) (“[A] taxpayer may have
substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of the
applicable statutory provision.”).
376. See supra notes 366–368 and accompanying text.
377. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003).
378. Id.
379. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f) (method of making adequate disclosure).
380. I.R.S. News Release IR-2021-202 (Oct. 15, 2021).
381. Id.
382. Id.
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that in the case of any such significant FAQs, its agents would allow
taxpayers to use their reasonable and good faith reliance on any
significant FAQs to assert a reasonable-cause defense against
negligence and other accuracy-related tax penalties. 383
While the IRS’s announcement appears to benefit taxpayers, it
is not enough to address the imbalance between formal and informal
tax law. Notably, the IRS’s new policy would not require the Agency to
be bound by its statements in FAQs or to publish all FAQs in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin. 384 Further, the IRS’s policy changes only
apply to certain FAQs—those that are “significant” in that they involve
newly enacted tax legislation (or, potentially, apply to “emerging
issues”)—rather than FAQs about established tax legislation and
policies. 385 For instance, the IRS’s policy could apply to FAQs regarding
legislation, if enacted, that would target high-income taxpayers
(including billionaires), 386 but, presumably, would not apply to FAQs
involving existing legislation that provides for the EITC, even if this
latter legislation possesses complex features. And the policy changes
would not extend to additional types of informal guidance such as IRS
publications, automated legal guidance, and IRS administrative
guidance. As a result, the new FAQ policy changes will likely do little
to help unrepresented taxpayers, who rely on a broad swath of informal
383. Id. Arguably, taxpayers could have asserted a reasonable-cause and good-faith defense
by showing reasonable reliance upon FAQs on the IRS website even before this announcement.
The relevant regulations allow the taxpayer to claim this defense if the taxpayer’s incorrect
position was due to “an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of
the facts and circumstances.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). The IRS’s October
2021 announcement, however, confirms that the IRS will not object to taxpayers’ attempts to
assert this defense when their reliance involves “significant FAQs on newly enacted tax
legislation.” I.R.S. News Release, supra note 380.
384. I.R.S. News Release, supra note 380. For additional criticism, see Alice Abreu & Richard
Greenstein, IRS Recent Guidance on FAQs: Too Little, Too Narrow, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct.
21,
2021),
https://procedurallytaxing.com/irs-recent-guidance-on-faqs-too-little-too-narrow/
[https://perma.cc/3YSQ-EZCL], which asserts that “the announcement does too little, because it
respects taxpayer reliance for penalty purposes only”; and Ted Afield, IRS Releases Update on
Frequently Asked Questions Part 4: The Low-Income Taxpayer Perspective, PROCEDURALLY TAXING
(Oct. 22, 2021), https://procedurallytaxing.com/irs-releases-update-on-frequently-asked-questionspart-4-the-low-income-taxpayer-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/68D4-XA2D], which argues that the
IRS’s failure to mitigate and correct FAQ errors or protect taxpayers who rely on FAQ explanations
goes against its declared “service-focused mission.”
385. I.R.S. News Release, supra note 380; see also Monte A. Jackel, IRS Releases Update on
Frequently Asked Questions Part 1, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct. 19, 2021),
https://procedurallytaxing.com/irs-releases-update-on-frequently-asked-questions-part-1/
[https://perma.cc/544V-JTR8] (“And what of the so-called emerging issues?” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
386. See, e.g., Kristina Peterson & Richard Rubin, Tax on Billionaires’ Unrealized Gains Will
Likely Be in Budget Package, Democrats Say, WALL ST. J. (Oct 24, 2021, 1:26 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-on-billionaires-unrealized-gains-will-likely-be-in-budgetpackage-democrats-say-11635096384 [https://perma.cc/D3NL-A2LH] (describing mark-to-market
legislative proposal).
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guidance to understand the tax law on nonemerging issues, because
they lack the ability to access formal law. We advise that broader
reforms should be made, in line with the suggestions we outline above.
D. Taxpayer Characteristics
Finally, the IRS and the Treasury should study how two-tiered
legal drafting affects different groups of taxpayers and report data
regarding the effects on taxpayers with different personal
characteristics, including, among others, income, filing status, and race.
Compared to data that is available in other research areas, analysis of
data on the personal characteristics of taxpayers is lacking. For
example, as Professor Jeremy Bearer-Friend has documented in detail,
the Treasury and IRS have not collected or published data that
describes the reported taxable income, tax deductions, and tax credits
disaggregated by race of taxpayers. 387 As a result of the “cascading
effects” of this lack of data, in 2021, President Biden issued an executive
order that established an “Interagency Working Group on Equitable
Data” that includes the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy. This group must offer recommendations on best practices for
studying effects of legal rules and policies on different individuals based
on race, ethnicity, gender, disability, and other characteristics. 388 To
better “measure and advance equity,” 389 we argue the government
should extend this research to consider the types of taxpayers that are
benefited and burdened by formal and informal tax law.
The Treasury and IRS adopt a markedly different approach to
collection of data on individuals’ characteristics in tax administration
compared to other agencies’ approaches to collecting this data. Each
year, the IRS publishes an annual “Data Book” on the website of its
Statistics of Income Division, which shows, in aggregate dollar
amounts, anonymized information such as taxpayers’ taxable income,
tax deductions, audit rates, and tax penalties, among many other
items. 390 Despite its length, this publication does not include
information on the use of tax lawyers or accountants by taxpayers
separated out by factors such as income, filing status, and race. 391 This
lack of information is not surprising given the experience of scholars.
For example, Professor Dorothy Brown has described the obstacles she
387. See Bearer-Friend, supra note 289, at 16.
388. Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
389. Id.
390. 1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 201.
391. Id. For further discussion, see Bearer-Friend, supra note 289, at 2–5, analyzing tax law’s
colorblindness; and Brown, supra note 289, underscoring this dynamic.
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faced in attempting to access data on the racial impact of the tax law in
the United States and how, as an alternative to reviewing IRS analyses,
she analyzed data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. 392 The Census
Bureau and other federal agencies collect information on individuals’
personal characteristics routinely, offering explanations such as “We
ask a question about a person’s race to create statistics about race and
to present other estimates by race groups.” 393
Treasury and the IRS should study the characteristics of
taxpayers who rely on informal administrative guidance such as FAQs
on the IRS website, automated legal guidance, and IRS publications.
There are numerous design possibilities for such a study. For example,
the IRS could include survey questions in its automated legal guidance,
such as ITA, regarding users’ income, filing status, and race. To
incentivize responses, the Treasury could permit taxpayers to rely on
the answers received from ITA for a reasonable basis defense, as we
have advocated earlier, as long as taxpayers can show that they have
answered ITA’s questions truthfully. 394 The IRS could also attempt to
collect information on the characteristics of taxpayers who use IRS
administrative guidance by including surveys following taxpayers’ use
of these services. 395 Private-sector organizations use these types of
surveys regularly, especially where users access a website where their
activity can be tracked. 396 Finally, the IRS could include questions
about taxpayer characteristics, as well as taxpayers’ use of informal
administrative guidance, in the IRS Free File program, a public-private
partnership that low-income taxpayers use to file their annual tax
returns. 397
Further, if the IRS were to collect information on taxpayers’
characteristics, it could collect and publish data on taxpayers’ use of
written opinions, which are primarily written by tax lawyers, to defend
against accuracy-related tax penalties by claiming the reasonable cause
and good faith defense. 398 These are just a few possibilities for gathering
392. Dorothy A. Brown, Tales from a Tax Crit, 10 PITT. TAX REV. 47, 52 (2012).
393. American Community Survey: Why We Ask Questions About . . . Race, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we-ask-each-question/race/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022) [https://perma.cc/NP7D-64XZ].
394. For discussion, see supra notes 369–375 and accompanying text.
395. See, e.g., RSCH., APPLIED ANALYTICS & STAT. DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N
5296, CATALOG NO. 71353Y, COMPREHENSIVE TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY (CTAS) 2020:
EXECUTIVE
REPORT
(Nov.
2020),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5296.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DP2-Y7AR].
396. See
Use
Analytics
with
Your
Site,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/sites/answer/97459?hl=en
(last
visited
Mar.
7,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/V5G9-XE6T] (explaining how to use Google to collect website data).
397. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 209, at 3.
398. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003).
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data on taxpayers’ access to tax advice. There are other potential
approaches, including analysis of the interaction of data collected by the
IRS and by other agencies (efforts which the IRS has pursued on topics
of taxpayer characteristics other than race). 399
A plan by the Treasury and IRS to gather data on the
characteristics of taxpayers who rely on IRS administrative guidance or
sophisticated advisors would likely raise several concerns. If the IRS
were to seek even more personal information from taxpayers than it
currently does, taxpayers might not respond to the questions asked,
especially if they are optional. This response could occur irrespective of
the forum for the questions, whether in automated legal guidance
systems or on the IRS Form 1040 itself. Further, if the IRS were to ask
for information regarding taxpayers’ race, the IRS could, as Professor
Bearer-Friend has suggested in his analysis, create the appearance of
discrimination against certain groups of taxpayers. 400 And the
introduction of questions regarding taxpayer characteristics, including
race, could cause the IRS to become the focus of scrutiny and debate by
legislators, potentially hampering its ability to seek increased
budgetary resources. 401
While these concerns are plausible, there are compelling
responses to each of them. First, regarding the concern that taxpayers
will not supply requested information, as we have suggested, the
government could incentivize participation through a variety of
approaches. These incentives could include adjusting the rules for the
reasonable basis penalty defense and providing taxpayers who answer
a voluntary survey with benefits such as prioritized access to a live
customer service representative, among others. Second, the IRS could
ameliorate the appearance of discrimination by providing concurrent
explanations of the reasons for the questions (similar to the approach
of the U.S. Census Bureau 402) and describing the legal rules that
prevent IRS agents from engaging in discrimination and otherwise
abusing their discretion. Finally, although questions regarding
taxpayers’ income, filing status, race, and other personal characteristics
could trigger legislative scrutiny of the IRS, such questions would be
consistent with data collection methods used by many other federal
agencies. 403
399. See Bearer-Friend, supra note 289, at 16–17 (discussing IRS’s publicly reported analysis
of effects of tax provisions on taxpayers, disaggregated by gender and age).
400. Id. at 55–56.
401. See id. at 54–55.
402. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 393.
403. Jeremy Bearer-Friend has shown that federal agencies other than the IRS, such as the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the U.S. Social Security System, and the U.S.
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CONCLUSION
While many other scholars have explored inequitable aspects of
the substance and enforcement of the law throughout the legal system,
this Article has highlighted an underappreciated inequity: different
people have access to different forms of the law, and these different
forms of the law do not have equal value. In considering the two tiers
of formal and informal law, this Article has made several novel
contributions.
First, we have reframed the discussion of informal
administrative guidance as a social justice issue. Formal law is binding
on government actors, but it is incomprehensible to most individuals
who lack access to tax advisors. By contrast, informal administrative
guidance is accessible to most people, but it is not binding on
government actors. As we have argued, this two-tiered system of law
may intensify existing inequities in substance and enforcement of the
law.
Second, using the IRS and the tax system as a case study, we
have demonstrated how the increasing use of informal law by agencies
can, ironically, exacerbate the differences between taxpayers. We have
shown how these two tiers of formal and informal tax law
systematically disadvantage taxpayers who lack access to sophisticated
advisors. The imbalance occurs irrespective of whether the IRS’s tax
guidance contains statements that, if taxpayers followed them, would
be taxpayer favorable or unfavorable. Further, we have shown how
taxpayers cannot use their reliance on IRS guidance to defend against
many civil tax penalties. Conversely, taxpayers who have access to
lawyers and accountants are in a significantly better strategic position.
Last, we have offered concrete policy prescriptions and an
agenda for future research regarding two-tiered legal systems. Our
proposals include reforming the drafting of the formal tax law, where
possible, using bright-line rules and formalization; changing the
drafting of informal tax law to include warnings of contrary authority;
revising the law regarding taxpayer reliance on informal tax law,
taking into account differences between unilateral and bilateral tax
guidance; and developing IRS research on how reliance on informal tax
law varies based on taxpayers’ personal characteristics, including
income, filing status, and race.
The recent explosion of administrative guidance during the
COVID-19 pandemic, when new complex laws were introduced and
Department of Housing and Urban Development, collect taxpayer demographic data as a central
component of their research missions. Bearer-Friend, supra note 289, at 34–36.
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access to human customer service representatives was not possible,
foreshadows a continually increasing issuance of informal law by
government agencies. The analysis of the resulting two-tiered legal
system presented in this Article should be of interest to legislators,
agency officials, and practitioners, and to scholars who study tax law,
administrative law, and social justice.

